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Abstract  
This thesis studies the viewpoint according to which many proposals made by the Athenian 
concerning the backround of laws and Magnesia could be characterized as democratic or 
undemocratic. For this reason in the analysis of such aspects there is a comparison of Magnesia with 
democratic Athens and other states having existed in this era. After that, there will be an attempt to 
give, inasmuch as it is possible the political color of Magnesia in the Laws. 
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1.Introduction 
This master thesis attempts to detect as much as possible democratic and undemocratic features in the 
Laws of Plato. But spontaneously reasonable questions emerge, such as ―What is democratic or 
undemocratic? How these aspects do function in the context of the Laws?‖. Before defining these 
aspects and answering these questions, it is of crucial importance to underscore that this thesis does 
not seek to interpret these terms in their modern meaning and adjust them in the frame of the Laws. 
Such an attempt would be an unfruitful anachronism. On the contrary it gives priority to the 
examination of the background of such elements as exposed in the Laws. To be more accurate the 
research question of this thesis is ―In what perspective each suggestion concerning the establishment 
of Magnesia could be regarded as democratic or undemocratic?‖. The criteria according to which such 
elements will be termed as democratic or undemocratic will be based on passages from scholars of 
this era such as Aristotle, Thucydides, Euripides who tried to approach these issues. 
The method used for the examination of this question is the following of the main thread of the 
dialogue that takes place in the Laws. By tracing the line of interlocutors‘ argumentation and 
reasoning, we will be able to understand and illustrate, inasmuch as it is possible, how, when and 
under which circumstances each discussant makes a case. In addition, even if interlocutors‘ proposals 
change during the dialogue it will be feasible to grasp the cause of this shift as the sequence of their 
thought will have already been examined. Consequently, by adopting this method the viewpoint of 
participants‘ suggestions that has to do with the establishment and organization of Magnesia will 
become clear and their analysis can be more fruitful.  
After paraphrasing and analyzing the base of these proposals follows the conclusion about the 
perspective of democratic and undemocratic aspects. Despite the fact that there is much debate on this 
issue and an exhaustive analysis of this topic may seem unattainable, it would be beneficial for the 
conclusion to elaborate on Karl‘s Popper work ―The Open Society and its Enemies‖1. As we will later 
see in this book of Popper there is a detailed reference to the Laws of Plato and especially to the 
political background that Magnesia would have had. It does also examine and explain all these 
elements from a different point of view. Therefore a critical reference to Popper‘s work can shed light 
on the interpretation of democratic and undemocratic perspectives of the Laws. Except for Popper, 
there will be a concise comparison of Magnesia with Callipolis so as to have a thorough command of 
Plato‘s politics and see the differences between these two colonies. This comparison will be useful to 
the final step of this thesis, namely the attempt to approach the political color of Magnesia. 
                                                          
1
   Popper (1945) 
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However before starting to perform these steps it is important to clarify that all translations of the 
Laws adduced in the thesis are taken from Bury
2
. In case of adducing my own translation or following 
another translator I will explicitly mention it. Apart from the Laws, the translations of the other Greek 
texts are also taken from the Loeb Classical Library and in each passage I refer to the translator. If I 
try to change the translation I will again give a detailed analysis of my proposal. As far as 
commentaries on the Laws are concerned I use England‘s work3 and for the tenth book I also use 
Mayhew‘s work4. 
1.1.  Democracy in the classical period 
As far as democracy of classical period is concerned it is very difficult to precisely define its meaning. 
Concerning this difficulty, it is characteristic that even the famous passage from Thucydides ‗θαὶ 
ὄλνκα κὲλ δηὰ ηὸ κὴ ἐο ὀιίγνπο ἀιι‘ ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ δεκνθξαηία θέθιεηαη‘5 which also exists in 
the present preamble to the draft of European Constitutional Treaty
6
 is under debate. The core of the 
matter is the interpretation of ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ. According to Gomme, ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ means ―the 
distribution, as it were, not so much of power, as of political activity;‖7. Nevertheless, if we take into 
account Ostwald‘s interpretation we will see that he offers a different explanation from this of 
Gomme. He translates ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ as ―run with a view to the interest of the many‖8. Therefore 
the dividing line betwee Ostwald and Gomme is that the first proposes that a democratic state acts in 
favor of the interest of the many, whilst the second does not claim so but elaborates on the active 
political participation of citizens in the proceedings of Athens. But is it possible to find a common 
basis so as to define democracy in classical period? 
There are two basic characteristics of the Athenian democracy that can hardly be disputed. The first is 
that in a democratic state, such as this of Athens, many citizens, and of course not all of them, did 
participate in the Assembly
9
. The second is that citizens could in principle possess an authority, for 
                                                          
2
   Bury (1926) 
3
   England (1921) 
4
   Mayhew (2008) 
5
  Thucydides 2.37.1: Χξώκεζα γὰξ πνιηηείᾳ νὐ δεινύζῃ ηνὺο η῵λ πέιαο λόκνπο, παξάδεηγκα δὲ κ᾵ιινλ αὐηνὶ 
ὄληεο ηηζὶλ ἢ κηκνύκελνη ἑηέξνπο. θαὶ ὄλνκα κὲλ δηὰ ηὸ κὴ ἐο ὀιίγνπο ἀιι‘ ἐο πιείνλαο νἰθεῖλ δεκνθξαηία 
θέθιεηαη (We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighboring states nay, 
we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few 
but to the multitude, is called a democracy). Transl. Smith (1920) 
6
  Council of the Europian Union (2003) , 66-67 
<https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v014/14.4treaty.html> 
7
  Gomme (1956) 108-109 : ―ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν means the distribution, as it were, not so much of power, as of 
political activity: hence the emphasis on μέηεζηι, the share of each citizen. For the use of  οἰκεῖν in the sense, not 
of ‗living in a place‘, simply (as in ii. 17. 3.) , but ‗of being a citizen‘ , cf. iii. 48. I, and 44. 2n. Elsewhere it is 
something between the two, with a qualifying adjective or adverb, ii. 71. 2, vi. 18. 7, 92. 5.) . 
8
   Ostwald (1986) 183,  For a detailed analysis of Thucydidean definition of democracy see also Hornblower, 
(1991)  298-299 
9
  Ober (1989) 54: ―The primary decision-making bodies were the citizen Assembly, the legislative body of  
Law-makers  (nomothetai), and the popular courts. All of these bodies met openly; the Assembly and courts met 
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instance they could become judges. Nevertheless the exclusion of certain categories of people from 
the assembly was more fact than fiction. A telling example is that women were not entitled to take 
part in the Assembly, but in any case these two fundamental characteristics could constitute a raw 
material for the understanding and definition of democracy in classical period. However, for a more 
illustrative description of the Athenian democracy it would be helpful to adduce other distinguishing 
features of it.  
Firstly, the Athenian democracy was not a representative one as most of the modern western 
democracies
10
. The Athenians were actively participating in the assembly and they had a voice in the 
social and political proceedings. The assembly was sovereign as it had the final decision on the most 
significant issues as these of war and peace, legislation, finance and treaties. Another fundamental 
principle of the Athenian democracy was ‗isēgoria‘ (ἰζεγνξία). It was the right of citizens to speak as 
equals in the assembly on matters of state importance
11
. It was also the distinguishing feature of 
democratic Athens, as in the assembly the herald was asking ―who wishes to address the assembly?‖ 
(ηίο ἀγνξεύεηλ βνύιεηαη;). No one was entitled to muzzle people who wanted to speak in the 
assembly. Demosthenes in his speech ‗On the Crown‘ (὘πὲξ Κηεζηθ῵ληνο πεξὶ ηνῦ Σηεθάλνπ) was 
complaining against Aeschines because he prevented him from addressing the audience. Demosthenes 
was claiming that such a debarment was not just and that it was also against the political etiquette :  
‗νὐ γὰξ ἀθαηξεῖζζαη δεῖ ηὸ πξνζειζεῖλ ηῶ δήκῳ θαὶ ιόγνπ ηπρεῖλ, νὐδ᾽ ἐλ ἐπεξείαο ηάμεη θαὶ θζόλνπ 
ηνῦην πνηεῖλ˙ νὔηε κὰ ηνὺο ζενὺο ὀξζ῵ο ἔρνλ νὔηε πνιηηηθὸλ νὔηε δίθαηόλ ἐζηηλ, ὦ ἄλδξεο 
Ἀζελαῖνη.‘12 
However, the fact that citizens of Athens could not muzzle the speakers in the assembly does not 
entail that they could not interrupt them or that they were obliged to listen to them. On the contrary, as 
Wallace stresses the Athenians ―felt no obligation to sit quietly and listen to talk they objected to‖13. 
The noun thorubos was used to describe the ―the confused noise of a crowded assembly‖.14 It is worth 
adducing how Thucydides describes such an uproarious assembly where the atmosphere was electric 
so as to illustrate the extent to which the Athenians were able to interrupt the public speakers. 
According to Thucydides when the Athenians had to take a serious decision in 425 BC they started to 
react in this way described at (4.28) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
frequently. Assembly meetings were open to all citizens; boards of Law-makers and juries were selected 
randomly and by lot from the citizen body‖.   
10
  Finley  (1973)  18 
11
  Ober  (1989)  78-79 
12
  Demosthenes 18.13:  (It is not right to debar a man from access to the Assembly and a fair hearing, still less 
to do so by way of spite and jealousy. No, by heavens, men of Athens, it is neither just, nor constitutional, nor 
honest!). Trans. C.A. Vince. J.H. Vince (1926) 
13
   Wallace  (2004)  223-224  
14
   LS J (1961) 803-804, For ζόξπβνο see also Plato, M., & Croiset, A. (1946) 255: ―ζόξπβνο, ὁ «trouble» 
ζόξπβνλ παξέρεη θαὶ ηαξαρήλ Pd. 66 d 5. App. Et ass.: ηαξαρή.‖ 
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ὁ δὲ Νηθίαο η῵λ ηε Ἀζελαίσλ ηη ὑπνζνξπβεζάλησλ 
ἐο ηὸλ Κιέσλα, ὅηη νὐ θαὶ λῦλ πιεῖ… νἱ δέ, νἷνλ 
ὄρινο 15  θηιεῖ πνηεῖλ, ὅζῳ κ᾵ιινλ ὁ Κιέσλ 
ὑπέθεπγε ηὸλ πινῦλ θαὶ ἐμαλερώξεη ηὰ εἰξεκέλα, 
ηόζῳ ἐπεθειεύνλην ηῶ Νηθίᾳ παξαδηδόλαη ηὴλ 
ἀξρὴλ θαὶ ἐθείλῳ ἐπεβόσλ πιεῖλ… ηνῖο δὲ 
Ἀζελαίνηο ἐλέπεζε κέλ ηη θαὶ γέισηνο ηῆ 
θνπθνινγίᾳ αὐηνῦ. 
(The Athenians thereupon began to clamour against 
Cleon, asking him why he did not sail even now….And 
the more Cleon tried to evade the expedition and to 
back out of his own proposal, the more insistently the 
Athenians, as is the way with a crowd, urged Nicias to 
give up the command and shouted to Cleon to sail…At 
this vain talk of his there was a burst of laughter on the 
part of the Athenians).  
Transl. Smith  (1920) 
  
In this passage there are three words that illsustrate the interventions of the audience during Nicias‘ 
speech. The first one is the participle ὑπνζνξπβεζάλησλ16 which is very close to the meaning of 
thorubos already mentioned. The second is the verb ἐπεβόσλ which means that the audience was 
shouting against Nicias when he was speaking. The third word of this passage is the noun ‗γέισο‘ 
(laughter)
17
 that characteristically shows the reaction of the audience when the proposal of Nicias 
seemed to be senseless. Therefore, the fact that sometimes the audience could intervene in the way 
described can hardly be questioned. 
Apart from ἰζεγνξία another democratic element that is also in use in the Laws, is παξξεζία. The first 
part of this word is π᾵ο and the second ῥ῅ζηο and it is translated as ‗frankness‘ or ‗freedom of 
speech‘18. In other words, unlike slaves, women and metics, the male citizens of Athens were free to 
express their opinion without any fear of censorship
19
. In order to show the extent to which someone 
could freely say whatever they like I adduce the words of the Theban Herald (θ῅ξπμ) in Euripides‘s 
―Suppliants” where democracy is criticized (ll. 399-428). 
Κ῅ξπμ: ηίο γ῅ο ηύξαλλνο ; πξὸο ηίλ᾽ ἀγγεῖιαί κε ρξὴ 
ιόγνπο Κξένληνο, ὃο θξαηεῖ Κάδκνπ ρζνλὸο 
἖ηενθιένπο ζαλόληνο ἀκθ᾽ ἑπηαζηόκνπο πύιαο ἀδειθῆ 
ρεηξὶ Πνιπλείθνπο ὕπν; 
 
(Theban Herald: Who is the despot of this land? To 
whom must I announce the message of Creon who 
rules over the land of Cadmus, since Eteocles was slain 
by the hand of his brother Polyneices, at the sevenfold 
gates of Thebes? 
                                                          
15
  According to Gomme (1956) 469:  ―ὄρινο is ‗the multitude‘ ‗a crowd‘, not the ‗mob‘. But Thucydides has no 
great belief in the dignity of popular assemblies.‖ 
16
  Hornblower (1996) 187: ―ὑπνζνξπβεζάλησλ ἐο ηὸλ Κιέσλα :‗were in a state of near uproar against Kleon‘. 
The word θόρσβος is the regular word for disturbance in the lawcourts, see V. Bers, ‗Dikastic Thorubos’, 
CRUX, I ff., at 4, calling the present passage ‗a sort of duel between the speaker and the crowd‘, i.e. an 
extension of law-court manners to the Assembly. (The prefix ὑπο- weakens the verb, hence my word ‗near‘.)‖   
17
  Hornblower (1996) 188: ― For laughter in Th. (rare and always unpleasant)‖ 
18
  LSJ (1961) 1344: ―outspokenness, frankness, freedom of speech, claimed by the Athenians as their privilege‖.  
19
  Balot (2004) 233: ―In the political world of democratic Athens, freedom of speech was a privilege that 
derived from a citizen‘s status qua citizen. Unlike slaves, foreigners, metics and Athenian women, Athenian 
citizen males were both permitted and encouraged to engage in frank and open discussion about matters of 
public concern.‖  
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Θεζεύο: πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ ἤξμσ ηνῦ ιόγνπ ςεπδ῵ο, μέλε, 
δεη῵λ ηύξαλλνλ ἐλζάδ᾽· νὐ γὰξ ἄξρεηαη ἑλὸο πξὸο 
ἀλδξὸο ἀιι᾽ ἐιεπζέξα πόιηο. Δ῅κνο δ‘ ἀλάζζεη 
δηαδνραῖζηλ ἐλ κέξεη ἐληαπζίαηζηλ, νὐρὶ ηῶ πινύηῳ 
δηδνὺο ηὸ πιεῖζηνλ ἀιιὰ ρὠ πέλεο ἔρσλ ἴζνλ. 
 
Κ῅ξπμ: ἓλ κὲλ ηόδ᾽ ἡκῖλ ὥζπεξ ἐλ πεζζνῖο δίδσο 
θξεῖζζνλ˙ πόιηο γὰξ ἧο ἐγὼ πάξεηκ᾽ ἄπν ἑλὸο πξὸο 
ἀλδξόο, νὐθ ὄριῳ θξαηύλεηαη νὐδ᾽ ἔζηηλ αὐηὴλ ὅζηηο 
ἐθραπλ῵λ ιόγνηο πξὸο θέξδνο ἴδηνλ ἄιινη᾽ ἄιινζε 
ζηξέθεη, ηὸ δ᾽ αὐηίρ᾽ ἡδὺο θαὶ δηδνὺο πνιιὴλ ράξηλ, 
ἐζαῦζηο ἔβιας᾽, εἶηα δηαβνιαῖο λέαηο θιέςαο ηὰ πξόζζε 
ζθάικαη᾽ ἐμέδπ δίθεο. ἄιισο ηε π῵ο ἂλ κὴ δηνξζεύσλ 
ιόγνπο ὀξζ῵ο δύλαηη᾽ ἂλ δ῅κνο εὐζύλεηλ πόιηλ; ὁ γὰξ 
ρξόλνο κάζεζηλ ἀληὶ ηνῦ ηάρνπο θξείζζσ δίδσζη. 
Γαπόλνο δ᾽ ἀλὴξ πέλεο, εἰ θαὶ γέλνηην κὴ ἀκαζήο, 
ἔξγσλ ὕπν νὐθ ἂλ δύλαηην πξὸο ηὰ θνίλ᾽ ἀπνβιέπεηλ. ἦ 
δὴ λνζ῵δεο ηνῦην ηνῖο ἀκείλνζηλ, ὅηαλ πνλεξὸο ἀμίσκ᾽ 
ἀλὴξ ἔρῃ γιώζζῃ θαηαζρὼλ δ῅κνλ, νὐδὲλ ὢλ ηὸ πξίλ  
 
 
 
 
Θεζεύο: θνκςόο γ᾽ ὁ θ῅ξπμ θαὶ παξεξγάηεο ιόγσλ. ἐπεὶ 
δ᾽ ἀγ῵λα θαὶ ζὺ ηόλδ᾽ ἠγσλίζσ, 
ἄθνπ᾽· ἅκηιιαλ γὰξ ζὺ πξνύζεθαο ιόγσλ. 
Theseus: You have made a false beginning to your 
speech, stranger, in seeking a despot here. For this city 
is not ruled by one man, but is free. The people rule in 
succession year by year, allowing no preference to 
wealth, but the poor man shares equally with the rich.   
 
Theban Herald:  You give me here an advantage, as in 
a game of checkers; for the city from which I come is 
ruled by one man only, not by the mob; no one there 
puffs up the citizens with specious words, and for his 
own advantage twists them this way or that, one 
moment dear to them and lavish of his favors, the next 
harmful to all; and yet by fresh calumnies of others he 
hides his former failures and escapes punishment. 
Besides, how would the people, if it cannot form true 
judgments, be able rightly to direct the state? No, it is 
time, not haste, that affords a better understanding. A 
poor farmer, even if he were not unschooled, would 
still be unable from his toil to give his mind to politics. 
Truly the better sort count it no healthy sign when the 
worthless man obtains a reputation by beguiling with 
words the populace, though before he was nothing  
 
Theseus: This herald is a clever fellow, a dabbler in the 
art of talk. But since you have thus entered the contest 
with me, listen awhile, for it was you that challenged a 
discussion). 
Transl.  Coleridge  (1938) 
 
What this passage illustrates is that a herald could dispute with frankness not only what the king was 
supporting but also the sovereignty of democracy per se. It is also notable that the severe 
accusations
20
against democratic Athens made by the Theban Herald are treated in a kind way by 
Theseus. Even if this passage does not totally reflect the historical truth about democratic Athens, it 
does have a kernel of truth; and this is the existence of frankness of the speech in classical Athens. 
                                                          
20
  Morwood (2007)  176: ― 409-25: The Theban herald responds with impudently dismissive arrogance to 
Theseus‘ proud assertion of democratic values‖. 
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However, this fact does not entail that in democratic Athens there were no restrictions and citizens 
could act with impunity or that the Athenians could ―live as they wished‖21. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that elections are the hallmark of modern democracy this was not valid 
in the case of ancient Athenian democracy. According to Aristotle elections were regarded as a means 
totally opposed to equality
22
. The point was that elections introduced the element of selection of the 
best people, of the ‗ἄξηζηνη‘ which resulted in the abolition of equality among people. Instead of 
elections, the Athenian democracy established the acquisition of offices ‗by lot‘ (ἐθ θιεξώζεσο). This 
practice was perceived as just because all citizens could in principle obtain an office. Therefore the 
way citizens were acquiring offices in classical Athens was the selection by lot and not the elections.  
What about Magnesia? In which way citizens would have occupied public offices? 
Last but not least, the establishment of ‗equality of the law‘ (ἰζνλνκία) was another foundation 
principle of the Athenian democracy
23
. In particular, no citizen was exempted by the law and all 
people were equal before the law
24
. Vlastos defined ἰζνλνκία as ―political equality maintained 
through the law and promoted by the law‖25. Ἰζνλνκία could be used as a synonym of democracy26. In 
order to highlight the meaning of ἰζνλνκία it would be useful to adduce a passage from the ―Funeral 
Oration‖ of Pericles that was addressed in 430 BC in honor of the deceased of the first year of 
Peloponnesian War. Thucydides in (2.37.1) puts in the mouth of Pericles these words: 
κέηεζηη δὲ θαηὰ κὲλ ηνὺο λόκνπο πξὸο ηὰ ἴδηα 
δηάθνξα π᾵ζη ηὸ ἴζνλ, θαηὰ δὲ ηὴλ ἀμίσζηλ, ὡο 
ἕθαζηνο ἔλ ηῳ εὐδνθηκεῖ, νὐθ ἀπὸ κέξνπο ηὸ 
πιένλ ἐο ηὰ θνηλὰ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀξεη῅ο πξνηηκ᾵ηαη, νὐδ᾽ 
αὖ θαηὰ πελίαλ, ἔρσλ γέ ηη ἀγαζὸλ δξ᾵ζαη ηὴλ 
πόιηλ, ἀμηώκαηνο ἀθαλείᾳ θεθώιπηαη. 
(If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice 
to all in their private differences; if to social 
standing, advancement in public life falls to 
reputation for capacity, class considerations not 
being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again 
does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve 
the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his 
condition).  
Transl. Smith (1926) 
                                                          
21
  Wallace (1996) 107 
22
  Aristotle Politics 1300a41-b5: ηὸ δὲ ηὰο κὲλ ἐθ πάλησλ ηὰο δ᾽ ἐθ ηηλ῵λ πνιηηηθὸλ ἀξηζηνθξαηηθ῵ο,ἢ ηὰο κὲλ 
αἱξέζεη ηὰο δὲ θιεξῶ, ηὸ δὲ ηηλὰο ἐθ ηηλ῵λ αἱξέζεη ὀιηγαξρηθὸλ θαὶ ηὸ ηηλὰο ἐθ ηηλ῵λ θιήξῳ(κὴ γηλνκέλνπ δ᾽, 
ὁκνίσο), θαὶ ηὸ ηηλὰο ἐθ ηηλ῵λ ἀκθνῖλ. ηὸ δὲ ηηλὰο ἐμ ἁπάλησλ ηό ηε ἐθ ηηλ῵λ αἱξέζεη πάληαο ἀξηζηνθξαηηθόλ. 
(But to appoint some offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an aristocratic 
bias; or to appoint some by vote and others by lot. And for a certain class to appoint from a certain class < by 
vote >  is oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by lot (although not working 
out in the same way), and for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by both methods. And for a certain 
class to make a preliminary selection from the whole body and then for all to appoint from among certain 
persons (thus selected) is aristocratic). Transl. H. Rackham (1932) 
23
  LSJ (1961) 838 : ―equality of political rights, the equality of a Greek democracy” 
24
  For a detailed analysis of isonomia and its relation with democracy see Lombardini (2013), 393-420 
25
  Vlastos  (1953)  337-366 
26
  Raaflaub (1996) 143: ―By then the term, although not confined to democracy and denoting any form of 
equality that was opposed to tyranny or narrow oligarchy, could almost be used as a synonym of dēmokratia.‖ 
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Through this passage is shown that in democratic Athens all citizens are considered to be equal.  Class 
divisions were not an obstacle to their advancement. If they were skilfull and able to contribute to the 
state then they would not have been excluded irrespective of wealth or birth. However, this fact does 
not imply that the rich and poor were totally equal. As Ober maintains most of the Athenian had to 
work for a living and only five to ten percent of the population did not need to do so
27
. It is also 
characteristic that many of the distinguished orators in the assembly and politicians were members of 
this leisure class. Consequently, in fact the rich citizens did have an advantage over the poor 
concerning the opportunities for advancencement in certain fields.  
1.2. Undemocratic elements 
The term undemocratic is a very broad one as it can denote many different types of governances.It can 
mean either aristocracy or monarchy-tyranny or oligarchy or elitism. The common characteristic of 
those terms is that the authority is distributed to a few people or even to one man. In other words, the 
majority of people are excluded from the acquisition of power. This is exactly the dividing line 
between democratic and undemocratic states. To elucidate the background of the undemocratic terms 
it would be useful to deal with each of them separately. For the illustration of these terms, it would 
helpful to make short, well-timed and apt correlations with governances existing in the ancient world. 
‗Aristocracy‘ (ἀξηζηνθξαηία) is when the ‗best‘ (ἄξηζηνη), those who are highly-equipped become 
sovereign in a society. But what are the criteria according to which certain people are supposed to be 
ἄξηζηνη? Aristotle28 mentions that ἄξηζηνη are those who do excel in ‗virtue‘ (ἀξεηή). The pivotal role 
that virtue plays in the Laws will be delineated in the second chapter of the thesis. Furthermore, 
Aristotle in the same passage of his work Politics mentions that Carthage is a telling example of 
aristocracy
29, as it combines ‗virtue and wealth‘ (ἀξηζηίλδελ θαὶ πινπηίλδελ).  
                                                          
27
 Ober (1989) 192: ― The Athenian leisure class consisted of only some 5 to 10 percent of the total citizen 
population, but the great majority, perhaps all, of the public speakers represented in the corpus of Attic orators, 
both private litigants and expert politicians, were members of this leisure class.‖ 
28
 Aristotle Politics 1293b2-7: ηὴλ γὰξ ἐθ η῵λ ἀξίζησλ ἁπι῵ο θαη᾽ ἀξεηὴλ πνιηηείαλ θαὶ κὴ πξὸο ὑπόζεζίλ ηηλα 
ἀγαζ῵λ ἀλδξ῵λ κόλελ δίθαηνλ πξνζαγνξεύεηλ ἀξηζηνθξαηίαλ: ἐλ κόλῃ γὰξ ἁπι῵ο ὁ αὐηὸο ἀλὴξ θαὶ πνιίηεο 
ἀγαζόο ἐζηηλ, νἱ δ᾽ ἐλ ηαῖο ἄιιαηο ἀγαζνὶ πξὸο ηὴλ πνιηηείαλ εἰζὶ ηὴλ αὑη῵λ (for it is right to apply the name 
‗aristocracy‘—‗government of the best‘—only to the constitution of which the citizens are best in virtue 
absolutely and not merely good men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for under it alone the same person is 
a good man and a good citizen absolutely, whereas those who are good under the other constitutions are good 
relatively to their own form of constitution). Transl. Rackham (1932) 
29
Aristotle Politics 1293b14-19: ὅπνπ νὖλ ἡ πνιηηεία βιέπεη εἴο ηε πινῦηνλ θαὶ ἀξεηὴλ θαὶ δ῅κνλ, νἷνλ ἐλ 
Καξρεδόλη, αὕηε ἀξηζηνθξαηηθή ἐζηηλ, θαὶ ἐλ αἷο εἰο ηὰ δύν κόλνλ, νἷνλ ἡ Λαθεδαηκνλίσλ, εἴο ηε ἀξεηὴλ θαὶ 
δ῅κνλ, θαὶ ἔζηη κίμηο η῵λ δύν ηνύησλ, δεκνθξαηίαο ηε θαὶ ἀξεη῅ο. (Where then the constitution takes in view 
wealth and virtue as well as the common people, as for instance at Carthage, this is of the nature of an 
aristocracy; and so also are the states, in which the constitution, like that of Sparta, takes in view two of these 
things only, virtue and the common people, and there is a mingling of these two factors, democracy and virtue). 
Transl. Rackham (1932) 
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As far as tyranny or monarchy is concerned, it is when only one person possesses the authority. At 
this moment it would be helpful to give an example so as to shed light on this fact. Aristotle again
30
 
gives an illustrative example about the five ephors in Sparta
31
. Despite the fact that they were annually 
elected by the assembly of Sparta, the Apella, and they were not allowed to be reelected their power 
was so strong that they are called ‗ἰζνηύξαλλνη‘ (equal to tyrant). Of course the most important point 
in the Laws is if the monarch-tyrant or any other regime acts in favor of the common interest or not. 
At last, ‗oligarchy‘ (ὀιηγαξρία) is obviously the governance according to which a few people ‗νἱ 
ὀιίγνη‘ do possess the authority. 
Consequently the main criterion used for defining an element in the Laws as democratic or not is if it 
tends to include or exclude people from it. In other words, if a proposal made by the Athenian and the 
other interlocutors addresses only to a few people and excludes the vast majority of Magnesia‘s 
citizens from it then it would be characterized as undemocratic. On the contrary, if a suggestion in the 
Laws targets many people and opens the door to them so as to participate to the political proceedings 
then it would termed as democratic. Another criterion is whether the proposal in question oppresses 
fiercely people to abide by the law or not. However, in order to adequately analyze these aspects it 
would be helpful to adduce some more special characteristics of the Laws.     
1.3.The natural law and the aim of the law in the Laws 
As far the illustration of Magnesia‘s legislative background is concerned, it would be proper not to 
elaborate on each legislative procedure, but on the spirit of the laws in the Laws as an initiation to the 
atmosphere of this work of Plato. The natural law and the preambles (πξννίκηα) of the laws are two 
distinctive characteristics of the Laws and a concise reference to them will elucidate the background 
of the laws in the Laws.  
 First of all the word λόκνο was covering a broad semantic field, as it could be referred to what we 
today call etiquette, morality, convention or custom. Of course this wide meaning of the word λόκνο 
is incorporated in the Laws. In other words, λόκνο assumes many different functions throughout the 
Laws as we will see later in the main corpus of the thesis. However, the principal aim of the law in the 
Laws is to shape behavior and to make the citizens of Magnesia virtuous, as the Athenian Stranger 
certifies. But what kind of personalities do they want to create? In general terms, the citizens of 
Magnesia would be embedded with‗αἰδώο‘ (modesty) and ‗ἀλδξεία‘ (courage)under the rule of 
                                                          
30
 The reason why I choose to adduce passages from Aristotle is that he offers exhaustive and informative 
instances that are helpful for a thorough understanding of the political situation of the fifth and fourth century 
BC. 
31
 Aristotle Politics 1270b14-17: θαὶ δηὰ ηὸ ηὴλ ἀξρὴλ εἶλαη ιίαλ κεγάιελ θαὶ ἰζνηύξαλλνλ δεκαγσγεῖλ αὐηνὺο 
ἠλαγθάδνλην θαὶ νἱ βαζηιεῖο, ὥζηε θαὶ ηαύηῃ ζπλεπηβιάπηεζζαη ηὴλ πνιηηείαλ: δεκνθξαηία γὰξ ἐμ 
ἀξηζηνθξαηίαο ζπλέβαηλελ. (And because the office was too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also 
were compelled to cultivate popular favor, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for out of 
an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy). Transl. Rackham (1932) 
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‗ινγηζκόο‘ (reasoning). In this way they will possess ‗wisdom‘ (θξόλεζηο) and ‗temperance‘ 
(ζσθξνζύλε) and they will be happy. This is the main aim of the Laws.There are many educational 
means called up, such as the ‗preambles‘ (πξννίκηα) and the drinking parties (ζπκπόζηα) for the 
fulfillment of this target. If this ultimate goal be achieved then happiness and justice will be 
established in the colony of Magnesia. 
But why do the Laws put special emphasis on one aim? At this point emerges the existence of natural 
law in the Laws of Plato.The principal doctrine of this theory is that law by its nature is designed for 
the accomplishment of a specific goal
32
 . For instance, in the case of the Laws is to mold virtuous 
citizens under the rule of reason. Furthermore each measure which is not conducive to this aim cannot 
be regarded as a law in the full sense. In order to shed more light on what natural law advocates it 
would very helpful to adduce a quote from Aquinas who was an adherent of this theory. In his work 
Summa Theologica he wrote that: ―Law is nothing other than a certain ordinance of reason, for the 
common good, promulgated by the person who has the care of the community‖33.  
But let us expose some more points of natural law and see their utility in the Laws. Firstly according 
to natural law, in the same way as certain things in nature do have a particular end so law has a 
specific aim. Secondly the goal of the law should be the establishment of public benefit and not the 
satisfaction of the ruler‘s interest. In the third place, the law should also be a carrier of reason in 
people‘s soul. As far as the context of the Laws is concerned these three requirements are put into 
effect. Particularly, in the Laws there is an ultimate goal of the law which is the shaping of virtuous 
citizens endowed with reason. Moreover in many cases the Athenian Stranger says explicitly that they 
legislate about the common interest that coincides with the interest of the state. The importance of 
reason becomes evident in the tenth book of the Laws in which the Athenian Stranger claims that the 
order of the universe is governed by reason. 
1.4 Preambles: The first step to a persuasive law 
As we will later see in the fourth book the Athenian claims that his aim is to make people as obedient 
as possible (ὡο εὐπεηζεζηάηνπο) in the realm of virtue 34.A means that contributes to the achievement 
                                                          
32
 Lewis (2009) 68: ―What is according to nature is a priority of the goods of the soul over those of the body and 
external goods in the political community first, and secondarily, for individuals. The best life is available to the 
citizens of the best city, which is a city ordered by laws that themselves areaccording to nature. Since the chief 
good of the soul is reason or intelligence, what is according to nature for human beings is what is according to 
reason.‖ 
33
 Aquinas Summa Theologica  1ae 2ae 95 T 
34
 Plato Laws 718c12-13: Ἀζελαῖνο :βνπινίκελ ἂλ αὐηνὺο ὡο εὐπεηζεζηάηνπο πξὸο ἀξεηὴλ εἶλαη, θαὶ δ῅ινλ ὅηη 
πεηξάζεηαη ηνῦην ὁ λνκνζέηεο ἐλ ἁπάζῃ πνηεῖλ ηῆ λνκνζεζίᾳ (I should desire the people to be as docile as 
possible in the matter of virtue; and this evidently is what the legislator will endeavor to effect in all his 
legislation). Transl. Bury (1926) modified: Instead of the word docile that Bury proposes, I use the word 
obedient after ckecking LSJ (1961) 726 
14 
 
of this goal is the use of preambles (πξννίκηα)35. The preambles illustrate the quintessence of the spirit 
of the Laws, as they aim at convincing citizens to consciously abide by the laws and to make them 
feel calm and willing to listen to the laws. The Athenian mentions characteristically that a law free of 
preamble is ‗fiercer‘ (ἀγξηώηεξνλ) 36. Undoubtedly fierce laws not only make people feel intimidated 
but also aim at oppressing them. Otherwise stated, if the intention of the lawgiver was to create fearful 
law-abiding citizens then existence of the preambles would be useless. On the contrary, the intention 
of the lawgiver in the Laws is the distribution of ‗λνῦο‘ to the citizens37. Therefore the existence of the 
preambles is in line with the main aim of the law, which is the shape of characters imbued with 
‗wisdom‘ (θξόλεζηο) and ‗temperance‘ (ζσθξνζύλε). However, what happens if the preambles fail to 
achieve this goal? In this case the ―violence of the law‖38 will be called up; and if this violence fails, 
then the final means marshaled is the capital punishment. 
1.5 Component parts of Magnesia  
Before paraphrasing and analyzing the background of the interlocutors‘ proposals it would be very 
useful to adduce the main structure of Magnesia in a schematic way based on Stalley‘s work39. 
Specifically, to illustrate the parts that will constitute this ἐλ ιόγῳ society and of course to show the 
way that they would function. Such a piece of information would be very useful for a concise 
recapitulation of Magnesia‘s social and political structure.  
Class division:  There would be four property classes in Magnesia. The first two would receive 
more benefits than the other two. However, the first two classes would have 
more responsibilities than the others, for the obligatory participation in the 
council and in the assembly. 
Assembly: 1) Open to all adult male citizens
40
. Women will also participate in it
41
 
2) Attendance: Mandatory for the best two proper classes 
3) Main function: The election of members of the council 
                                                          
35
 For an overview of preambles see Bartels (2014) 190-195 
36
 Plato Laws 720e4 
37
 Plato Laws 714a1-2 : ηὴλ ηνῦ λνῦ δηαλνκὴλ ἐπνλνκάδνληαο λόκνλ (giving to reason's ordering the name of 
―law.‖). Bury (1926) 
38
  Plato Laws 942e4 
39
  Stalley (1983)  186-189 
40
 Plato Laws 753b: Ἀζελαῖνο: πάληεο κὲλ θνηλσλνύλησλ η῅ο η῵λ ἀξρόλησλ αἱξέζεσο ὁπόζνηπεξ ἂλ ὅπια 
ἱππηθὰ ἢ πεδηθὰ ηηζ῵ληαη θαὶ πνιέκνπ θεθνηλσλήθσζηλ ἐλ ηαῖο ζθεηέξαηο αὐη῵λ η῅ο ἡιηθίαο δπλάκεζηλ (In the 
selection of officials all men shall take part who carry arms, as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, or who have 
served in war so far as their age and ability allowed). Transl. Bury (1926) 
41
  Plato Laws 805c7-d: Ἀζελαῖνο:  ηὸ δ᾽ ἡκέηεξνλ δηαθέιεπκα ἐλ ηνύηνηο νὐθ ἀπνζβήζεηαη ηὸ κὴ νὐ ιέγεηλ ὡο 
δεῖ παηδείαο ηε θαὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ ὅηη κάιηζηα θνηλσλεῖλ ηὸ ζ῅ιπ γέλνο ἡκῖλ ηῶ η῵λ ἀξξέλσλ γέλεη ( nor shall we be 
hereby precluded from asserting in our doctrine that the female sex must share with the male, to the greatest 
extent possible, both in education and in all else). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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Council:  1)  Ninety (90) members from each property class
42
 
2)  Mandatory nomination for the best two property classes
43
. 
3)  It summons the assembly and guards the city
44
 
Guardians of the 
Laws:  
1) Thirty seven (37) citizens
45
, at least fifty years old. They can be guardians for 
no more than twenty years
46
. 
2) The way they are elected is this: Each citizen writes down the name of the 
person he regards as the most suitable for this position. The names of these 
nominees are exhibited for thirty days through which objections are allowed.  
Initially there are 300 applicants and after a selection they are reduced to 100. In 
the end through elections they remain 37
47
. 
3) It would be the most powerful organ of the state as it guards the laws, keeps 
the property registers. 
 
Nocturnal Council 
48
     1) It would consist of the elite of Magnesia
49
, and it would investigate and  
                                             guard the laws. It would reeducate the atheists. 
 
2. Paraphrasing and analyzing democratic and undemocratic elements in the Laws 
At this chapter there is an attempt to detect as much as possible proposals of the interlocutors about 
the creation of Magnesia, the colony that the speakers theoretically, in speech try to create. After 
detecting such proposals there will a paraphrasis and analysis of the viewpoint according to which 
each suggestion could be characterized as democratic and undemocratic. The point of paraphrasing 
book by book is not to lose the thread of the dialogue that is very difficult to follow as the topic at 
issue change constantly during the dialogue. In addition, as it has already been mentioned in the 
introduction in this way, we can examine, as much as as possible, the specific circustances according 
to which each speaker argues. What is more, this book by book analysis can illustrate the differences 
in the opinions of the interlocutors as the dialogue unfolds.In other words, one of the speakers may 
change opinion during the dialogue. 
 
                                                          
42
  Plato Laws 756b8-c3 
43
  Plato Laws 756c10-d3 
44
  Plato Laws 758a-d 
45
  Plato Laws 752e8-9 
46
  Plato Laws 755a4-6 
47
  Plato Laws 753c-d 
48
   There are two different accounts for the nocturnal council. The first is 951c-952d and the second 961a-
968e. 
49
   The ten oldest guardians of the laws, all those who have received honors, those citizens that have been 
sent abroad in order to see how other societies work 
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2.1. BOOK I OF THE LAWS OF PLATΟ 
2.1.1 Friendly mood and παππησία from the beginning of the dialogue 
The very first questions posed by the interlocutors, such as ―ζεὸο ἤ ηηο ἀλζξώπσλ ὑκῖλ, ὦ μέλνη, 
εἴιεθε ηὴλ αἰηίαλ η῅ο η῵λ λόκσλ δηαζέζεσο;‖ 50 pave the way for the fundamental subject of the Laws 
which is not other than the research of the government structure and laws of Magnesia 
51
. At first, 
Cleinias, Megillus and the Athenian Stranger during their walk from Cnossus to the grotto of Zeus in 
mountain Ida start to exchange opinions about the origin of their laws and the enactment of them. The 
atmosphere is very friendly and conducive to dialectical conversation. All the interlocutors do actively 
participate in the discussion with the Athenian Stranger having a leading role. Cleinias answers 
directly to Athenian about the origin of the laws, as his first word ―ζεόο‖ 52 is the answer to the 
question of Athenian. Megillus also answers to Cleinias with straightness and again the first word that 
he utters ―Ναί‖ is a clear answer to Cleinias‘ query. As a result all these unclouded and direct answers 
amount to παξξεζία that has been analyzed in the introduction. In this case, it is illustrated that the 
interlocutors do not avoid or afraid of straightforwardly answering to the question. Their speech is 
frank without any intention to confuse the questioner.  
Except for that, it is clear from the very beginning of the first book that the dominant role of the 
Athenian in the dialogue does not obstruct the other two interlocutors from stating their opinions. 
They do not accept unquestioningly whatever the Athenian Stranger proposes. On the contrary, many 
times in the Laws they raise serious objections to his argumentation
53
 . To be more accurate, both 
Cleinias and Megillus do no afraid of being muzzled so they can freely express their viewpoint on the 
topics mooted. In addition to this, the pleasant mood of the dialogue is certified firstly by all the 
interlocutors. At first, Cleinias declares that he is very eager to listen to the Athenian and discuss ‗in a 
friendly spirit‘ (εὐλνίᾳ δερνκέλῳ)54  . In response to Cleinias, the Athenian states that he does not aim 
at censuring the laws of Crete but only ‗at expressing his doubts‘ (κ᾵ιινλ δὲ ἀπνξ῵λ) 55 . These 
mutual friendly feelings are also certified by Megillus who shows his ‗affection‘ (εὔλνηα)56  to the 
                                                          
50
   Plato Laws  624a1-2: ( Athenian: To whom do you ascribe the authorship of your legal arrangements, 
Strangers? To a god or to some man?). Transl. Bury (1926) 
51
  Plato Laws 625a 4-6 : Ἀζελαῖνο: πξνζδνθ῵ νὐθ ἂλ ἀεδ῵ο πεξί ηε πνιηηείαο ηὰ λῦλ θαὶ λόκσλ ηὴλ δηαηξηβήλ, 
ιέγνληάο ηε θαὶ ἀθνύνληαο ἅκα θαηὰ ηὴλ πνξείαλ, πνηήζαζζαη.( I imagine, have no aversion to our occupying 
ourselves as we go along in discussion on the subject of government and laws). Transl. Bury (1926) 
52
  Plato  Laws  624a3 
53
  Plato  Laws  660 b 
54
  Plato  Laws  635b1 
55
  Plato  Laws  635b2-4: Ἀζελαῖνο: - θαι῵ο: νὐ κὴλ ἐπηηηκ῵λ γε ἐξ῵ ηνῖο λόκνηο πσ, πξὶλ βεβαίσο εἰο δύλακηλ 
δηαζθέςαζζαη, κ᾵ιινλ δὲ ἀπνξ῵λ (Good! But until I have investigated your laws as carefully as I can I shall not 
censure them but rather express the doubts I feel). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
56
  Plato  Laws 642b7 
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Athenian by stating that Sparta is a ‗proxenus‘ (πξόμελνο)57 of Athens and that he conceives Athens as 
‗a second motherland‘ (δεπηέξα νὖζα παηξίο). Therefore the ground for a friendly and fruitful 
conversation instilled with παξξεζία has already been prepared. 
2.1.2 The militarist modus vivendi of Crete and Sparta versus ξύμπασα ἀπετή 
As the dialogue unfolds, the interlocutors discuss about the laws of Crete and Sparta. Both of them are 
structured in order to prevail in the war against other states. Every aspect of Spartans‘ and Cretans‘ 
life, both in ‗public and private life‘ (δεκνζίᾳ θαὶ ἰδίᾳ)58, is interwoven with this prevalence over the 
other people. To achieve this goal, they have as priority the establishment of ἀλδξεία in the soul of the 
citizens. It is exactly this one sided aim that finds Athenian opposed to it as it be will analyzed below. 
Besides, such a model of life was restricting citizens from developing whichever aspect of their 
personality they wanted apart from the military one. This modus vivendi could hardly be applied to a 
democratic state where people have the option to be occupied with several things. For instance in the 
democratic Athens, citizens were able to participate in the public Assembly and exchange opinions 
with other citizens, to attend tragedies, comedies in the annual feast of Μεγάια Δηνλύζηα or to 
exercise and learn how to wrestle in the παιαίζηξαη59. On the contrary, those restrictions already 
described appeal to totalitarian regimes that do not leave room to citizens for having all these options. 
At this point it is useful to approach the proposal of the Athenian. In opposition to this warlike way of 
living of Crete, that gives prominence to ἀλδξεία, the Athenian Stranger claims that people should 
aim at goodness as a whole (πξὸο π᾵ζαλ ἀξεηήλ) 60  which in turn results in the ‗complete 
righteousness‘ (ηειέα δηθαηνζύλε)61 . Such a goodness would consist of wisdom, rational temperance 
of soul, justice and courage (ἀλδξεία) that has already been described62. The Athenian intends to mold 
fully-developed citizens who will embedded with these elements and they will not care only for 
                                                          
57
  Plato  Laws 642b5 
58
  Plato  Laws 626 a 7-8 
59
  Webster (1969) 49: ―The paidotribes probably took his pupils in either a palaistra (wrestling school), or a 
gymnasium (training ground)… Both palaistra and gymnasium catered primarily for athletics and had tracks for 
running, sometimes covered, sometimes in the open (the Academy had a grove of sacred olive trees)‖. 
60
  Plato Laws 628c10-12:  Ἀζελαῖνο: ηό γε κὴλ ἄξηζηνλ νὔηε ὁ πόιεκνο νὔηε ἡ ζηάζηο, ἀπεπθηὸλ δὲ ηὸ 
δεεζ῅λαη ηνύησλ, εἰξήλε δὲ πξὸο ἀιιήινπο ἅκα θαὶ θηινθξνζύλε (The highest good, however, is neither war 
nor civil strife—which things we should pray rather to be saved from—but peace one with another and friendly 
feeling. Moreover, it would seem that the victory). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
61
 Plato Laws 630b10-630c5: Ἀζελαῖνο: δ῅ινλ ὅηη ηόδε, ὡο παληὸο κ᾵ιινλ θαὶ ὁ ηῆδε παξὰ Δηὸο λνκνζέηεο, π᾵ο 
ηε νὗ θαὶ ζκηθξὸλ ὄθεινο, νὐθ ἄιιν ἢ πξὸο ηὴλ κεγίζηελ ἀξεηὴλ κάιηζηα βιέπσλ ἀεὶ ζήζεη ηνὺο λόκνπο: ἔζηη 
δέ, ὥο θεζηλ Θένγληο, αὕηε πηζηόηεο ἐλ ηνῖο δεηλνῖο, ἥλ ηηο δηθαηνζύλελ ἂλ ηειέαλ ὀλνκάζεηελ. (Plainly it is 
this: both the Heaven-taught legislator of Crete and every legislator who is worth his salt will most assuredly 
legislate always with a single eye to the highest goodness and to that alone; and this (to quote Theognis) consists 
in ―loyalty in danger,‖ and one might term it ―complete righteousness‖).  Transl.  Bury (1926) 
62
  Plato Laws 631c5-9: Ἀζελαῖνο:  ὃ δὴ πξ῵ηνλ αὖ η῵λ ζείσλ ἡγεκνλνῦλ ἐζηηλ ἀγαζ῵λ, ἡ θξόλεζηο, δεύηεξνλ 
δὲ κεηὰ λνῦ ζώθξσλ ςπρ῅ο ἕμηο, ἐθ δὲ ηνύησλ κεη᾽ ἀλδξείαο θξαζέλησλ ηξίηνλ ἂλ εἴε δηθαηνζύλε, ηέηαξηνλ δὲ 
ἀλδξεία (And wisdom, in turn, has first place among the goods that are divine, and rational temperance of soul 
comes second; from these two, when united with courage, there issues justice, as the third; and the fourth is 
courage). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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ἀλδξεία. In this way the establishment of peace among people63 will be feasible. What is more, 
Athenian‘s ultimate purpose is not war, but peace and friendly feeling of people (εἰξήλε δὲ πξὸο 
ἀιιήινπο θαὶ θηινθξνζύλε). It is characteristic that the most highly acclaimed type of judge and 
legislator are those who achieve to reconcile people and not those who just punish them
64
. This 
intention of the Athenian to create fully fledged citizens with these qualities is totally opposed to the 
one sided aim of Crete‘s and Sparta‘s concerning the molding of their citizens. Therefore, Athenian‘s 
proposal does not aim at harshly suppressing people and thus it could be hardly characterized as 
authoritarian. On the contrary, he aims at broadening the horizons of Magnesia‘s citizens by 
inculcating them with goodness as a whole (πξὸο π᾵ζαλ ἀξεηήλ). Such a proposal is more close to a 
democratic state, for instance this of classical Athens, where there is not adhesion to only one aim, as 
in Sparta and Crete. However, which are the means that will help people to acquire goodness as a 
whole? 
2.1.3. Education and drinking party 
Εducation (παηδεία) is the mechanism65 that is able to impart ἀξεηή to people and transform a man 
into ‗perfect‘ (ηέιενλ) citizen who ‗will understand how to rule and be ruled righteously‘ (ἄξρεηλ ηε 
θαὶ ἄξρεζζαη ἐπηζηάκελνλ κεηὰ δίθεο)66. The Athenian compares an individual human being with a 
divine puppet which consists of three forces: ζάξξνο, θόβνο, ινγηζκόο. He proposes that only if 
ινγηζκόο has a leading role and harnesses the other two elements, that is to say ζάξξνο and θόβνο, 
will a man be able to make the right choices and approach ἀξεηή. What is more, all people are 
supposed to possess ινγηζκόλ as the Athenian does not mention that there are people deprived of it67. 
In a way, ινγηζκόο is an inherent characteristic of people. Therefore, if this is true, then potentially all 
people can become virtuous when ινγηζκόο become sovereign in their soul. This proposal is 
embedded with a democratic conviction as no one is excluded from ἀξεηή. A contrario, it would be 
elitistic to claim that only some people do have ινγηζκόλ and by expansion only some people can 
                                                          
63
  Plato Laws 628c 10- 13: (Athenian: The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife- which things 
we should pray rather to be saved from- but peace one with another and friendly feeling). Transl. Bury (1926) 
64
  Plato Laws 628a 1- 6: Ἀζελαῖνο: ηξίηνλ δέ πνπ δηθαζηὴλ πξὸο ἀξεηὴλ εἴπσκελ, εἴ ηηο εἴε ηνηνῦηνο ὅζηηο 
παξαιαβὼλ ζπγγέλεηαλ κίαλ δηαθεξνκέλελ, κήηε ἀπνιέζεηελ κεδέλα, δηαιιάμαο δὲ εἰο ηὸλ ἐπίινηπνλ ρξόλνλ, 
λόκνπο αὐηνῖο ζείο, πξὸο ἀιιήινπο παξαθπιάηηεηλ δύλαηην ὥζηε εἶλαη θίινπο …καθξῶ ἀκείλσλ γίγλνηη᾽ ἂλ ὁ 
ηνηνῦηνο δηθαζηήο ηε θαὶ λνκνζέηεο. (And there is a third judge we must mention (third and best in point of 
merit), - if indeed such a judge can be found,- who in dealing with a single divided family will destroy none of 
them but reconcile them… A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best). Transl. Bury (1926) 
65
 Bartels (2014) 99: ― From the outset, παηδεία is interpreted as practicing or training consistent with the 
Spartan idea that ἀλδξεία must be trained, which was the point of departure in the discussion. Παηδεία is a 
teleological process. The virtuous (ἀγαζνί) are those able to control themselves, which, in turn, is consistent 
with the earlier definition of virtue as being θξείηησλ ἑαπηνῦ‖. 
66
 Plato Laws 643e8-9 
67
 Bartels (2014) 105: ―The puppet- analogy reflects an essentially optimistic attitude towards the human 
capacity for excellence: ινγηζκόοis innate in every person by nature; it is implied that paideia in principle 
enables every person to become ἀγαζόο.‖  
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become virtuous. Apart from the sovereignty of ινγηζκόο in the soul of a man this dominance should 
also be put in effect in the city. In the case of the city the reign of  ινγηζκόο  is the law68. 
At this point it is useful to see what would happen in a ζπκπόζηνλ according to the Athenian. Would 
wine destroy the prevalence of ινγηζκόο? The Athenian answers no, as according to him a significant 
means conducive to test people‘s soul and help to the acquisition of μύκπαζα ἀξεηή in the Laws is the 
drinking party (ζπκπόζηνλ)69. So ινγηζκόο could not be ruptured in a ζπκπόζηνλ, but on the contrary 
it plays a leading role. By the way, the friendly atmosphere that exists in the drinking party is 
compatible with the pleasant mood already established in the Laws. Such a warm atmosphere 
established under the influence of wine urges the ζάξξνο of the participants in the drinking party and 
as a result they can freely express their opinions with παξξεζία70. But at the same time they should be 
instilled with fear in order not to do something wrong. This kind of fear is identified with ‗modesty‘ 
(αἰδώο). Therefore the benefit accruing to the participants from the drinking party is that they will 
learn how to maintain the delicate equilibrium between ζάξξνο and θόβνο-αἰδώο through the 
predominance of ινγηζκόο. Eventually they will approach ἀξεηή and they will be able to make 
rational choices in their lives. 
Given all these facts, which could be the relation of ζπκπόζηνλ with democratic or undemocratic 
aspects? Despite the fact that this question may sound awkward, the answer to this is that the function 
of the drinking party does have an egalitarian background
71
. Accurately, there is no hint that some 
people are more susceptible to an exaggerating ζάξξνο or θόβνο or that certain people are more prone 
than others to a rational use of ζάξξνο and θόβνο. Of course this fact does not entail that all people are 
regarded as having the same skills. As a result, the point is that people are not excluded from 
approaching ἀξεηή, but all of them potentially are able to become virtuous. However, in which way 
would ζπκπόζηνλ function? 
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 Plato Laws 645a1-3: Ἀζελαῖνο: δ᾽ εἶλαη ηὴλ ηνῦ ινγηζκνῦ ἀγσγὴλ ρξπζ῅λ θαὶ ἱεξάλ, η῅ο πόιεσο θνηλὸλ 
λόκνλ ἐπηθαινπκέλελ (it is the leading-string, golden and holy, of ―calculation,‖ entitled the public law of the 
State). Transl. Bury (1926) 
69
  Raalte Van (2004) 306 : ― As a test for the soul, wine (ἡ ἐλ νἴλῳ βάζαλνο) is absolutely unrivaled for 
cheapness, safety and speed…the consumption of wine is a test for the quality of the soul itself‖ 
70
  Plato Laws 649b3: Ἀζελαῖνο: θαὶ ηειεπη῵λ δὴ πάζεο ὁ ηνηνῦηνο παξξεζίαο ὡο ζνθὸο ὢλ κεζηνῦηαη θαὶ 
ἐιεπζεξίαο, πάζεο δὲ ἀθνβίαο, ὥζηε εἰπεῖλ ηε ἀόθλσο ὁηηνῦλ ὡζαύησο δὲ θαὶ πξ᾵μαη;  (he abounds in every 
kind of licence of speech and action and every kind of audacity, without a scruple as to what he says or what he 
does) Transl. Bury (1926) 
71
   Bartels (2014) 114: ―There is no suggestion that some people are more prone to act on the basis of pleasures, 
or that some people are better capable of being θξείηησλἑαπηνῦthan others- contrast Republic, where different 
people of different classes have different kinds of ἀξεηή, and virtue depends on one‘s social function. The 
symposion tests people‘s moral quality, but this test presupposes individual differences rather than differences 
between kinds of people (as Callipolis does). Correspondingly, the kind of social order that incorporates this 
uniform notion of ἀξεηή is relatively egalitarian.‖  
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2.1.4. The necessity of a commander in the drinking party and in society 
The need for a commander (ἄξρσλ) who will be wise (ζνθόο) and sober (λήθσλ)72 is essential for the 
true function of ζπκπόζηνλ. In other words, the unencumbered operation of the ζπκπόζηνλ depends to 
a great extent on the wisdom and soberness of the commander. It is obvious that a commander who is 
intoxicated could not have but an erosive influence both on the participants of the drinking party and 
on its function. Apart from ζπκπόζηνλ, the need for a ‗commander‘ (ἄξρσλ) is required in every 
public association
73
. For instance, a sea captain should have certain qualities, one of them being 
‗soberness‘ (λεθαιηόηεο). A drunken sea captain (κεζύσλ θπβεξλήηεο)74or a drunken commander can 
be the cause of the catastrophe both of the ship and the army. Ostensibly this allegation could be 
characterized as elitist because the success or failure depends on the qualities of the leader.  
However, this point is not an in depth one as it does not take into consideration the overall context of 
the Laws.  The core of the matter is the emphasis of the Athenian on certain qualities, either wisdom 
or courage or fear. In other words, the Athenian aims at establishing these qualities in the soul of the 
people that will be under the influence of ινγηζκόο. As a result it is not the leader per se who governs 
but these qualities integrated in the each leader. Besides, we should not abolish the fact that the 
Athenian does not claim that there are people unable to be taught or acquire these elements, in 
opposition to what is stated in the Republic. His aim is to implant these qualities in the soul of the 
people and in the core of the city and not to muzzle people and suppress their individual rights
75
. 
Consequently, commanders do not try to manipulate people in favor of their vested interest but they 
aim at making people accept these qualities consciously. As a result these features will be established 
in people‘s soul under the rule of ινγηζκόο. Besides, later in the fourth book law is presented as 
‗distribution of reason‘ (ἡ ηνῦ λνῦ δηαλνκὴ), which is very close to the analysis already adduced76. To 
be more precise, if citizens instill these elements in their soul then they will reach perfection, as they 
will be able to ‗understand how both to rule and be ruled righteously‘ (ἄξρεηλ ηε θαὶ ἄξρεζζαη 
ἐπηζηάκελνλ κεηὰ δίθεο)77. The commanders possess this kind of education and they are trying to 
impart this to citizens. As a result the Athenian‘s proposal is that people should become educated and 
that this educational process will result in the sovereignty of θξείηηνλνο ἑαπηνῦ in citizen‘s soul. In 
this way they will be able both to govern and to be governed, as Solon‘s saying goes‗after having 
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 Plato Laws 640d5: Ἀζελαῖνο :Then the commander we set over drunken men should be sober and wise, rather 
than the opposite? (νὐθνῦλ λήθνληά ηε θαὶ ζνθὸλ ἄξρνληα κεζπόλησλ δεῖ θαζηζηάλαη, θαὶ κὴ ηνὐλαληίνλ;). 
Transl. Bury (1926) 
73
 Plato Laws 640a5-7 
74
 Plato Laws 641a1 
75
 Popper (1945) 169-170 
76
 Plato Laws 714a2: Ἀζελαῖνο: ηὴλ ηνῦ λνῦ δηαλνκὴλ ἐπνλνκάδνληαο λόκνλ (giving to reason's ordering the 
name of ―law‖).  Transl.  Bury (1926) 
77
 Plato Laws 643 e 5-8 : (Athenian : The education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which 
makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and to be ruled 
righteously). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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learnt how to be ruled you will learn how to govern‘ (ἄξρεζζαη καζὼλ ἄξρεηλ ἐπηζηήζεη). Therefore, 
the point is that many aspects that the Athenian proposes may seem authoritarian, for instance the 
need for a commander in the ζπκπόζηνλ, but a penetrating analysis shows that this is not the case. 
This fact is confirmed in the end of this first book by the Athenian himself who mentions that his aim 
is to examine the ‗natures‘ (θύζεηο) and the ‗conditions‘ (ἕμεηο) of people‘s soul and to cure them 
through the art of politics
78
.  
BOOK II 
2.2 Χοπεία: An educational means 
In this book
79
 the issue on debate is the benefits accruing to the participants in wine-parties from these 
manifestations. In particular, if symposia are beneficial to the acquisition of παηδεία or not. However 
this question remains unanswered until the end of this book. Initially, there is a conversation about the 
practice of choral singing and dancing, both of them called ρνξεία. This discussion is of crucial 
importance
80
, as many proposals exposed in it herald the basic structure of symposia which is later 
analyzed. As far as ρνξεία is concerned, it constitutes the first phase on the road to the obtainment of 
παηδεία and in general it is perceived as a primordial part of education 81.The fact that the Athenian 
attributes to ρνξεία such a glowing honor reflectsthe common belief of the Athenians concerning this 
issue 
82
. But in which way ρνξεία could be perfectly taught?  
By posing a rhetorical question the Athenian maintains that the poets should not be allowed to teach 
whatever they favor concerning ‗ρνξεία‖83. At this point it would not be an apt observation to claim 
that Athenian‘s suggestion constitutes a strict suppression to the freedom of poets. On the contrary, 
                                                          
78
  Plato Laws 650b6-9 
79
  As I have already stressed at the the beginning of chapter 2 the point of paraphrasing book by book is to 
trace, as much as it is possible, the thread of the dialogue in order to be able to understand when and under 
which circustances each proposal is made. In addition in this way it will be feasible to examine if the opinions of 
the interlocutors remain stagnant throughout the dialogue or change. 
80
  It is useful to make a key note about the role of ‗shame‘ (αἰζρύλε) in the Laws. According to the Athenian, 
the way that people used to dance and sing was supposed to reflect many aspects of their behavior, of their 
character (see Laws 655d5-9). In agreement with the end of the first book the Athenian examines the ‗natures‘ 
(θύζεηο) and the ‗habits‘ (μπλήζεηαη), a word very close to ‗ἕμεηο‘, of people who participate in choric 
performances (ρνξεῖαη). He claims that when people dance according to their nature (θαηὰ θύζηλ) they feel 
delighted, whilst when they dance or sing contrary to their nature (παξὰ θύζηλ) they do not. Such people are 
ashamed (αἰζρύλνληαη) to act in front of wise and educated people and.As we will see later this feeling of shame 
(αἰζρύλε) will play a significant role in molding virtuous characters in the ἐλιόγῳcolony. Therefore we must 
keep in mind that αἰζρύλεis an element that influences people‘s acts throughout the Laws. 
81
  Plato  Laws 654 b 1-3: (Athenian :Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without choir-training, and the 
educated man fully choir-trained? Cleinias: Certainly)  Transl. Bury (1926) 
82
 Morrow (1960) 302: ―In giving choreia this position of honor, Plato is not expressing merely a personal 
preference, but is reflecting the common opinion of his fellow countrymen. Greek music and dancing have left 
no enduring monuments comparable to‖ 
83
 Plato Laws 656 c 1- 9:  (Now where laws are, or will be in the future, rightly laid down regarding musical 
education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be granted such license that they may teach whatever 
form of rhythm or tune or words they best like themselves to the children of law-abiding citizens and the young 
men in the choirs, no matter what the result may be in the way of virtue or depravity?). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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the Athenian maintains that the aim of teaching should not be other than the impartment of virtue to 
the students. So ρνξεία should aim at virtue. However, a crucial question is: ―how virtue is stated and 
interpreted by the interlocutors?‖. Despite the fact that the whole work of Laws is instilled with this 
question, at this book there is a tentative answer. In particular, ‗virtue‘ (ἀξεηή) is explicated as a 
‗concordance‘ (ζπκθσλία) between the two elements of ἡδνλαί and ιύπαη84.This definition deals with 
children and the first phase of education. Therefore, the Athenian Stranger focuses on the right 
guidance of the poets from the lawgivers. 
However, the core of the matter is the criteria that are required for the most perfect judge. In other 
words, who is the most suitable person in order to judge which music or tune is conducive to virtue? 
In which way should he judge drama or arts? According to the Athenian Stranger a true judge should 
firstly be governed by the principles of wisdom and courage
85
. Another trait of each judge is that he 
should not be influenced by the people or yield to the audience. If someone takes into account the 
background of modern judges of choric performances or arts in general then they will understand that 
they do have a cognitive background pertained to the object that they judge.  Therefore following this 
way of thinking these qualifications proposed by the Athenian could hardly be characterized as 
undemocratic as a judge would not be a judge had he acted as a mouthpiece of people. But what was 
in effect in the period in question?  Were judges so distinguished as the modern? 
In Plato‘s time, these requirements to become a judge were not valid. For instance in ancient Athenian 
performances, such as dramas played in the theatres which incidentally were also an educational 
means, the judges were not connoisseurs. On the contrary, they were elected by lot
86
. So potentially 
many citizens could become judges. Apart from this, they did also pay heed to the reactions of 
audience. In opposition to this fact, the Athenian suggests that the verdicts of the audience should not 
be taken into account
87
.A true judge (ὁ ἀιεζὴο θξηηήο) should not be influenced by the ‗uproar‘ 
(ζόξπβνλ)88 of the crowd and should meet the requirements already exposed. By the way, the word 
ζόξπβνο denotes noise and confusion89. Such an uproar can have an erosive influence on a judge, as it 
could result in the loss of ινγηζκόο, which should be sovereign in the case of a right judgement. 
Consequently, if these prerequisites are examined in the light of what was in effect in the time that the 
Laws were written, then these requirements could be characterized as aristocratic or elitist. In other 
                                                          
84
  Bartels (2014) 117-118 
85
  Plato Laws 659a 3-5: (And we say that the judges of these matters need virtue for the reason that they need to 
possess not only wisdom in general, but especially courage). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
86
 The production of the tragic contests (2008) Available form <http://www.greektheatre.gr/cont.html> ―At the 
end of the presentation ten judges were being elected, one out of every urn, five of which, chosen by lottery, 
were deciding for the winner, after taking under consideration and the opinion of the audience (based on their 
reactions)‖. 
87
 Plato Laws 659 a 6-9 : For the true judge should not take his verdicts from the dictation of the audience , nor 
yield weakly to the uproar of the crowd or his own lack of education;  
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 Plato Laws 659a7-8: Ἀζελαῖνο: θαὶ ἐθπιεηηόκελνλ ὑπὸ ζνξύβνπ η῵λ πνιι῵λθαὶ η῅ο αὑηνῦ ἀπαηδεπζίαο‖- 
―nor yield weakly to the uproar of the crowd or his own lack of education. Transl. Bury (1926)  
89
  LSJ (1981) 803: ―noise, the confused noise of a crowded assembly, uproar, clamour” 
23 
 
words, from an ancient democratic Athenian point of view, the belief that only educated and best 
people ―ηνὺο βειηίζηνπο θαὶ ἱθαλ῵ο πεπαηδεπκέλνπο‖could become judges would be regarded as 
undemocratic or elitist
90
. So this proposal of the Athenian could be chararecterized as elitistic. 
2.2.1. The corrosive influence of χειποτονία 
In addition to this elitism, another undemocratic trait is stated through a reference to the Sicilian law 
about theatrical awards. In particular, Sicilian spectators ―award the prize by show of hands‖91. The 
Athenian Stranger is totally opposed to ρεηξνηνλία, as he contends that people who are lacking in 
cognitive background judge a work according to their own low standards. As a result, ‗ρεηξνηνλία‘ has 
an erosive influence not only on the poets, as they degrade their level to this of the audience, but also 
to the spectators themselves, due to the fact that they either remain static or they deteriorate
92
. Had 
spectators followed an example superior to them they would have progressed. Consequently, the 
Athenian Stranger emphasizes especially on people who are knowledgeable about the domain of 
ρνξεία and not on the beliefs of the biggest part multitude. 
At this point emerges again the main difference between the Laws and what was in effect in the 
theaters of democratic Athens where judges were elected by lot
93
. In particular, the Athenian is totally 
opposed to the assumption of duties from people who do not possess a thorough command of their 
role. People who are uneducated should not be entitled to judge, as they do not meet the standards to 
do so. Therefore, in the case of judging in the theatrical competitions, judges should be those who 
have the knowledgeable background to judge and not elected by lot or take into consideration what 
common people and πι῅ζνο believe. This conviction of the Athenian is posed by another rhetorical 
question ―Ὁ δὲ ηὸ ὀξζ῵ο κὴ γηγλώζθσλ ἆξ᾽ ἄλ πνηε ηό γε εὖ θαὶ ηὸ θαθ῵ο δπλαηὸο εἴε δηαγλ῵λαη;- 
And would a man who does not know what constitutes correctness be able to decide as to the 
goodness or badness of a poem?‖94 
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 Plato Laws 668a 1-3 : ( Athenian : I should regard that music which pleases the best men and the highly 
educated as about the best, and as quite the best if it pleases the one man who excels all others in virtue and 
education). Transl.  Bury  (1926) 
91
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  Plato Laws 668 d 1-3 
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On the contrary, according to Aristotle
95
, Greek people used to regard lot as a primary element of 
democracy. In particular, their democratic method was to choose officials by lot while elections were, 
if anything, an oligarchic procedure. But why did they believe so? Because if all men are regarded as 
equal, then all were equally deserving of office and they did not give careful thought to whom they 
chose. In particular, according to their beliefs, through the elections people try to find the most 
suitable person to hold office and this fact implies that some are better qualified than others. Although, 
the Athenian does not espouse this conviction and he shares the view of elections as a method of 
choosing the candidates best equipped for office. Later in the fifth Book this topic will be explained 
more thoroughly. 
Nevertheless, would it be feasible to transfer this pleasure of the experts to the common citizens
96
? 
The unnamed Athenian assumes that only if people train the feelings of pleasure and pain, will they 
be able to obtain them
97
. As a result the acquisition of those feelings relies to a great extent on the 
competent guidance of experts and of course on people themselves. The poets are the intermediary 
link as they will inculcate spectators with those feelings. And what happens if some poets are 
unteachable or unwilling to learn them? In this case the true legislator should compel them 
ἀλαγθάζεη98  to learn those feelings. Therefore, according to the three interlocutors, the good legislator 
is he who will guarantee that the poets are infused by the right feelings of pleasure and pain. Then 
those poets will impart these true feelings to the people. 
2.2.2. From χοπεία to συμπόσια 
As I have already mentioned in the beginning of this second book, all these references to the judges 
and poets lay the foundations for the true structure of symposia which constitute a means of education. 
The educational aim of the drinking party is stated through a metaphor. Particularly, the Athenian 
mentions that in a similar way to the iron which melts when it is heated so the souls of the people 
become ‗ductile‘ (εὐάγσγνη) in a banquette through wine. After that, a man who has the ‗ability‘ 
(δπλάκελνο) and ‗knowledge‘ (ἐπηζηάκελνο) is he who will ‗train‘ (παηδεύεηλ) and ‗mold‘ (πιάηηεηλ) 
the souls of the banqueters
99
. Besides the way that the drinking party functions has many common 
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 Aristotle Politics 1294b8-13: ιέγσ δ᾽ νἷνλ δνθεῖ δεκνθξαηηθὸλ κὲλ εἶλαη ηὸ θιεξσηὰο εἶλαη ηὰο ἀξράο, ηὸ δ᾽ 
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from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy 
that this is not to be on a property-qualification).  Transl. Rackham (1932) 
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Morrow (1960) 309-310 
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characteristics with the function of Magnesia as we will later find out. But can the banquette per se be 
associated with democratic or undemocratic aspects? 
The way that the drinking party works could hardly be characterized as totally democratic or 
undemocratic, even if it may include some elements of these categories.  For instance, all these 
requirements for the commanders already exposed in conjunction with the predominance of ‗sober‘ 
(ἀζόξπβνη)100 and ‗sedate commanders‘ (λήθνληεο ζηξαηεγνί) in the symposia could be characterized 
as undemocratic from an ancient Athenian point of view
101
. Particularly, the idea that there were some 
people supposed to be more skillful than others was regarded as undemocratic.What is more, certain 
people, such as the bondsmen, are a priori excluded from the drinking party. Of course the exclusion 
of magistrates, or judges, or pilots during their office could not be characterized as undemocratic, as it 
has a more practical background, not to drunk them when they have tasks. 
However, the existence of these elements does not entail that the drinking party is mainly 
undemocratic. On the contrary, the aim of the drinking party transcends the strict bounds of 
democracy or oligarchy or aristocracy. In particular, it aims at molding virtuous citizens instilled with 
‗modesty‘ (αἰδώο) who will act in favor of the state and will do ‗most good‘ (κέγηζηνλ ἀγαζόλ)102 to 
the city. Consequently, I suggest that the drinking party itself cannot be related with any way of 
governing, even if its structure and function do have some elements that could be characterized as 
democratic or undemocratic. 
                                                                    BOOK III 
2.3 Human society before the flood of Deucalion 
The beginning of this book looks like a completely new start. The three interlocutors strive to find out 
the ‗origin‘ (ἀξρή)103 of the government. Apart from this, they commonly attempt to discover the 
reasons for the recurrent changes or destructions of the constitutions emerged in a long period of time. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
δπλακέλῳ ηε θαὶ ἐπηζηακέλῳ παηδεύεηλ ηε θαὶ πιάηηεηλ, θαζάπεξ ὅη᾽ ἦζαλ λέαη (And did we not say that when 
this takes place, the souls of the drinkers turn softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too; whence 
they become ductile, just as when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and the ability to 
train and mould them. And now, even as then, the man who is to mould them is the good legislator;). Transl. 
Bury (1926) 
100
  Incidentally, the word ‗ἀζόξπβνη‘ calls into the mind of the reader the erosive influence of ‗ζόξπβνο‘ already 
analyzed in the introduction. 
101
  Plato Laws  671 d5-14: (And as law-wardens of these laws and cooperators therewith, there must be sober 
and sedate men to act as commanders over the un-sober; for to fight drunkenness without these would be a more 
formidable task than to fight enemies without sedate leaders. Any man who refuses willingly to obey these men 
and the officers of Dionysus ( who are over sixty years of age) shall incur as much disgrace as the man who 
disobeys the officers of Ares, and even more). Transl. Bury (1926) 
102
  Plato Laws 664a3-4:  Ἀζελαῖνο: ὥζηε νὐδὲλ ἄιιν αὐηὸλ δεῖ ζθνπνῦληα ἀλεπξίζθεηλ ἢ ηί πείζαο κέγηζηνλ 
ἀγαζὸλ ἐξγάζαηην ἂλ πόιηλ (so that the only question he has to consider in his inventing is what would do most 
good to the State). Transl. Bury (1926) 
103
 Plato Laws 676a 1-2: (Athenian: Now, what are we to say about the origin of government?). 
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This topic seems initially irrelevant with the main themes of the Laws already discussed. So why did 
they start to investigate this issue? For if this research becomes fruitful, they will be able both to 
perceive what happened in the past and in turn to be more conscious and cognizant of what they try to 
discover. They will be able to approach, inasmuch as possible, the principles according to which their 
new Cretan city could be governed
104
. 
The starting point for this research is the flood of Deucalion
105
. Before this deluge, people used to 
coexist harmoniously as they were prospering; they were neither rich nor poor.This ‗mediocrity‘ 
(κεζόηεο) resulted in the formation of the most ‗noble characters‘ (γελλαηόηαηα ἤζε) in the society106. 
As detailed below the role of this mediocritas is a crucial one in the Laws
107
. At this point, the 
Athenian states more explicitly the aim of his investigation, which is not other than the role of law and 
lawgiver in the establishment of the state before the flood. Particularly, do those people needed laws 
and lawgivers
108
? 
 In the answers of those questions lie the first undemocratic elements of this third book. The Athenian 
claims that in this period people were following ‗the laws of their father‘ (παηξίνηο λόκνηο). 
Specifically, the Athenian portrays the regime of the state before Deucalion‘s deluge as ‗headship‘ 
(δπλαζηεία) which undoubtedly has an undemocratic connotation. Aristotle in his Politics defines this 
kind of ‗headship‘ as the hereditary authority of the father of a group109. This nepotism is described 
through a reference to Odyssey
110
 of Homer where it is stated that during these early years there were 
no councils and each clan enacted its own laws. Namely, when people started to create the first kind 
of society they were as a small flock of birds that were ruled by patriarchal law
111
. Therefore, up to 
this point there is no hint to a democratic structure of the early societies. 
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105
 Plato Laws 677 a 10  
106
 Plato Laws 679e 1-2: (Athenian: And that they were also more simple and brave and temperate, and in all 
ways more righteous?). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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Morrow (1960) 521 : ―The concept that serves as guide to the Athenian legislator in the designing of his 
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Plato Laws Trans. R.G. Bury.680 a 1-2:That we may understand what possible need of laws the men of that 
time had, and who their lawgiver was. 
109
 Aristotle Politics 1252b17 
110
Plato Laws 680 b 6-9: Ἀζελαῖνο (he quotes Homer Od. 9.112) 
ηνῖζηλ δ᾽ νὔη᾽ ἀγνξαὶ βνπιεθόξνη νὔηε ζέκηζηεο, 
 
ἀιι᾽ νἵ γ᾽ ὑςει῵λ ὀξέσλ λαίνπζη θάξελα 
 
ἐλ ζπέζζη γιαθπξνῖζη, ζεκηζηεύεη δὲ ἕθαζηνο 
 
 παίδσλ ἠδ᾽ἀιόρσλ, νὐδ᾽ἀιιήισλ ἀιέγνπζηλ.  
 
( No halls of council and no laws are theirs, 
 
But within hollow caves on mountain heights 
                                                                                        
Aloft they dwell, each making his own law 
 
For wife and child ; of others reck they naught). 
Transl. Bury (1926) 
 
111
 Plato  Laws 680 e 1-2 
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2.3.1. The constitution of Sparta: Ideal description? 
As the dialogue unfolds, the Athenian refers to real historical events and not to mythology
112
. Namely, 
he analyzes the constitution of Sparta, according to which Argos and Messene were ruled. It is 
explicitly stated that the regime was monarchical with each city having its own king. Another 
accusation against democratic regimes is the way they used to distribute the property. Particularly, in 
a non-tyrannical status quo citizens are free to raise objections to rulers concerning the equality of 
property
113
. Many times these objections are supposed to be serious objections to the application of 
the laws. On the contrary, tyrannical regimes do not procrastinate to implement the laws, as decisions 
are immediately taken and applied by the tyrants. If this indictment against democratic regimes is true, 
then could someone claim that the Athenian is favorably disposed towards the constitution of Sparta? 
I propose that it would be very difficult to give a verified and totally clear answer to this question. 
However, another indication of Athenian‘s disposition to Sparta, and of course not proof, is that the he 
attributes the long existence of Sparta to the consistent and stable application of its laws. In other 
words, had Messene‘s and Argos‘ constitution been so well-organized as Sparta‘s they would not 
have been collapsed
114
.In addition, the Athenian also praises the army of Sparta claiming that it was 
instilled with more virtue than the army which went to Troy
115
. Nevertheless, even if we suppose that 
all this is true, then again it would not be right to claim that the Athenian espouses entirely the 
sociopolitical structure of Sparta. However, what we deserve to say is that certain elements of the 
Spartan constitution may seem to be beneficial to the attempt of the interlocutors to construct the in 
speech colony. But what eventually do the interlocutors propose? What was the fruit of this looking in 
the past? 
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 Plato Laws 684d10-e4:  Ἀζελαῖνο:ὡο ἐπηρεηξνῦληη δὴ λνκνζέηῃ θηλεῖλ η῵λ ηνηνύησλ ηη π᾵ο ἀπαληᾶ ιέγσλ κὴ 
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114
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remained stable—and that was your State, Megillus). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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 Plato Laws 685e1-2:  Ἀζελαῖνο: ηνῦ ἐπὶ Τξνίαλ ἀθηθνκέλνπ δηαθέξεηλ πξὸο ἀξεηήλ ( that this army was 
superior in valor to the army which went to Troy). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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2.3.2. Wisdom and media via between two extremes: liberty and tyranny 
 What the Athenian tried to show through this historical discussion is the need for the implantation of 
‗wisdom‘ (λνῦο) in people‘s souls116. Ννῦο and θξόλεζηο eradicate the ‗ignorance‘ (ἀκάζηα) which is 
supposed to be the cause of many ruins
117
.This need is evident through the comparison of people‘s 
souls with a state. In particular the ruling element of the soul is voῦο. Only if people obtain reason will 
they be able to establish a well-structured state and possess ‗prosperity‘ (εὐπξαγία). They will abide 
by the laws not because they will be obliged to do so, but because they will have perceived the 
meaning of true obedience to the laws. By the way, the acquisition of λνῦο heralds the role of law in 
the society, namely ‗ἡ ηνῦ λνῦ δηαλνκή‘ (the distribution of reason)118, as it is stated in the fourth 
book. But how ‗voῦο‘ can be related with democratic or undemocratic aspects? 
Of course voῦο per se is irrelevant with such aspects. However, the fact that citizens lacking in voῦο 
will not be entitled to occupy an office in Magnesia is pertinent to such aspects. Those people are 
supposed to be ‗home wreckers‘ (νἰθνθζόξνη)119. Such a barrier to unreasonable citizens is totally 
undemocratic, especially from a classical Athenian point of view
120
. In other words, in democratic 
Athens all citizens potentially were able to possess an axiom and climb in the rank.  Apart from this, 
the acquisition of voῦο, of θξόλεζηο results in making the right choices. As far as the constitutions are 
concerned, the right road is supposed to be the middle one between the two extremes, the 
embodiments of which are Persia and Athens.  Specifically, the via media, between the extreme 
monarchy, as enforced in Persia, and utmost direct democracy, as established in Athens, is a modest 
combination among elements of those two governances
121
. The Athenian claims that Persia was 
flourishing when slavery was combined with freedom. The mixture of those two opposite kinds of 
governing resulted in the stability of the state.  The downfall of Persia started when Cyrus who was 
lacking in right education and upbringing, took the authority. 
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The other extreme was the ‗excessive liberty‘ (π᾵ζα ἐιεπζεξία)122, the embodiment of which was 
democratic classical Athens. To elucidate his argument, the Athenian adduces a telling example which 
deals with the judgment of music. Specifically he claims that in Athens, the criterion according to 
which each kind of music was regarded as qualitative or not was not the evaluation of knowledgeable 
musicians but the pleasure of the unknowledgeable ‗crowd‘ (πι῅ζνπο). As a result aristocracy123, 
namely experts‘ assessment of music, was displaced by ‗theatrocracy‘ (ζεαηξνθξαηία)124, namely the 
rule of the crowd. This theatrocracy in music was a springboard to ἡ πάλησλ εἰο πάληα ζνθίαο δόμα 
θαὶ παξαλνκία125. There was no whiff of αἰδνῦο, of αἰζρύλεο. But could this critique of Athenian to 
his city be regarded as a mordant attack to democracy in general? 
Such an approach may not be valid. Even if in Plato‘s era such a conviction could be regarded as 
undemocratic this fact does not entail that it was indeed so. The Athenian does not condemn 
democracy per se but the fact that each person is able to decide about things that he or she ignores. In 
other words, the fact that he is in favor of connoisseurs does not imply that he rejects democracy. 
Nevertheless, the core of the matter is the domains that someone calls upon the intervention of a 
leading expert and to which extent. For instance, as far as the Athenian is concerned he regards music 
as an educational means of highest importance and due to this fact he asks for the help of expert 
musicians. In particular, only such adepts are supposed to be able to educate people by teaching them 
the right (θαιόλ) kind of music.  
However, someone could sensibly say ―And what if I want music only for amusement?‖ or ―Does 
indeed exist a right kind of music?‖. Such questions are indeed reasonable and by the way, music is 
not the only domain in which such an intervention occurs in the Laws, but one the many. As a result, 
if someone could elicit an undemocratic element from this dominance of the connoisseurs in the Laws, 
this would be that people are forced to obey a leading authority or those better of them and deprived 
of taking initiatives to find something new
126
. In a way as Popper puts it in his critique of Plato ―There 
must be a censorship of all intellectual activities of the ruling class, and a continual propaganda 
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aiming at molding and unifying their minds. All innovation in education, legislation, and religion 
must be prevented or suppressed‖127. 
Eventually, the three interlocutors did find the reason of constitutions‘ declines, which is ignorance 
leading to the lack of ‗middle way‘ (κεηξηόηεηνο). Therefore the road that the interlocutors will follow 
in their attempt to create Magnesia is the middle one between ΄despotism‘ (ηνῦ δεζπόδεηλ) and 
‗freedom‘ (ἐιεπζεξία). As far as democratic and undemocratic aspects are concerned, the discussants 
seem to espouse some elements of them but always in conjunction with ‗modesty‘ (κεηξηόηεο), as 
analyzed before. These proposals pave the way for the discussion of the fundamental question of the 
Laws expressed by the Athenian π῵ο πνη᾽ ἂλ πόιηο ἄξηζηα νἰθνίε, θαὶ ἰδίᾳ π῵ο ἄλ ηηο βέιηηζηα ηὸλ 
αὑηνῦ βίνλ δηαγάγνη 128 . Now the interlocutors are ready to pragmatically discuss about the 
establishment of the Magnesia. 
                                                                           BOOK IV 
2.4. Which would a fulfilling regime? 
The Athenian introduces a fictional lawgiver in their company and asks him what kind of governance 
he does prefer in order to manage the state satisfactorily.The fictitious answer given by the lawgiver, 
namely the Athenian, is that he could manage the state well enough provided that firstly it would be 
‗under monarchy‘ (ηπξαλλνπκέλελ κνη δόηε ηὴλ πόιηλ)129 and secondly that the monarch would be 
imbued with certain qualities. Such a monarch should be λένο θαὶ κλήκσλ θαὶ εὐκαζὴο θαὶ ἀλδξεῖνο 
θαὶ κεγαινπξεπὴο θύζεη θαί εὐηπρήο 130 . It is needless to say that the first prerequisite, this of 
monarchy, is undoubtedly undemocratic.  In the second requirement lies the quintessence of elitism, 
as the Athenian seeks for a top monarch with exceptional abilities. In a way such a monarch could be 
the embodiment of all the values that the Athenian wants to establish in his in speech colony as such a 
leader can ‗be wise‘ (θξνλεῖλ) and ‗be prudent‘ (ζσθξνλεῖλ)131. 
Apart from this highly equipped monarch, the Athenian himself, not by mouth of the hypothetical 
lawgiver, offers the second and third best solution. The former is the governance of two rulers and the 
latter the authority under three rulers
132
. Of course the background of those rulers should be equal to 
this of the first solution. Apparently, those proposals could be characterized as aristocratic. 
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Furthermore, the undemocratic beliefs of the Athenian are also reflected in his approach that the more 
rulers are the more difficult for a state to be governed is. In other words, at this point, the Athenian 
excludes the vast majority of the citizens from the act of ruling. He explicitly supports that the best 
state results more easily first from a ´monarchy‘ (ἐθ ηπξαλλίδνο) secondly from a ‗constitutional 
monarchy‘ (ἐθ βαζηιηθ῅ο πνιηηείαο) and thirdly from ‗some form of democracy‘ (ἔθ ηηλνο 
δεκνθξαηίαο)133. But what is the background of this elitism?  What is the Athenian‘s point of view? 
The words that modern scholars use to describe Plato‘s political theory, for instance elitism or 
totalitarianism
134
, even if they are true, they do not show the depth of its thought. In the Laws and 
specifically in this fourth book a word that could briefly describe Athenian‘s proposal is noocracy, 
namely the predominance of ‗λνῦο‘ in a state as he himself characteristically declares ηὸ ηνῦ ἀιεζ῵ο 
η῵λ ηὸλ λνῦλ ἐρόλησλ δεζπόδνληνο ζενῦ ὄλνκα ιέγεζζαη135. Throughout this book the Athenian refers 
to the prevalence of certain qualifications that combine ‗wisdom‘ (θξόλεζηο) with ‗prudence‘ 
(ζσθξνζύλε) both of them having divine origin. It is exactly the sovereignty of these merits that 
should be established in the state. These assets are embodied in people. Therefore it is not a monarch 
per se or two or even three rulers who would govern in Magnesia, but these highest values. 
Furthermore, regardless of the form of governance, either democracy or oligarchy, all interlocutors do 
agree that the core of the matter is the self-restraint of people‘s soul in a state. People who possess 
political power should not be susceptible to ‗lusts‘ (ἡδνλάο) or ‗pleasures‘ (ἐπηζπκίαο). Of course the 
doctrine of ‗modesty‘ (κεηξηόηεο) emerges again, as it is stressed that if a state is comprised of 
citizens prone to surfeit then inevitably there is no hope for the salvation of the state
136
. Consequently, 
despite the fact that modesty of soul may not fall into the strict frame of kinds of governances, it is 
surely a foundation stone for the prosperity and happiness of a state, which constitute significant aims 
of the Laws. But after all, speaking on more practical terms spontaneously arouses a question: In 
which way people should be governed so as to be happy, prosper and self-restrained? In this answer 
underlie significant democratic and undemocratic elements. 
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ἀπιήζηῳ θαθῶ λνζήκαηη ζπλερνκέλελ, ἄξμεη δὴ πόιεσο ἤ ηηλνο ἰδηώηνπ θαηαπαηήζαο ὁ ηνηνῦηνο ηνὺο λόκνπο, 
ὃ λπλδὴ ἐιέγνκελ, νὐθ ἔζηη ζσηεξίαο κεραλή. (But if an individual man or an oligarchy or a democracy, 
possessed of a soul which strives after pleasures and lusts and seeks to surfeit itself therewith, having no 
continence and being the victim of a plague that is endless and insatiate of evil-if such an one shall rule over a 
State or an individual by trampling on the laws, then there is no means of salvation).  Transl. Bury (1926) 
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2.4.1. Πειθώ or βία? 
The Athenian suggests that the lawgiver should aim at making citizens ‗as persuadable as he possibly 
can‘ (ὡο εὐπεηζεζηάηνπο)137. He intends to make citizens accept the laws willingly and consciously. 
For this reason the Athenian proposes the establishment of the ‗preambles‘ (πξννίκηα) which will aid 
the conscious obedience of citizens to the law
138
. This legislative practice is very innovative for its era, 
as citizens are not called to conform to sterile, strict laws, but they are firstly initiated to the spirit of 
laws. On the other hand, if laws are lacking in preambles they are regarded as ‗fiercer‘ (ἀγξηώηεξνη)139. 
They are perceived by the citizens as more resistant and they conform to the laws under the threat of 
punishment or violence. Therefore, if preambles are convincing, citizens will abide by the laws 
willingly and not under the fear of violence and the tyrannical command of the law will become 
useless.   
At this point it is evident that the Laws does not aim at intimidating people or coerce them to comply 
with the laws. Its priority is to implant the spirit of law in citizens‘ soul. When people are instilled 
with such a law-obedience they will not need the enactment of laws in order to abide by the laws. The 
point is that ―A person is his own lawgiver and does not need the laws‖as Bartels proposes140. Such a 
treatment to people is compatible only with democratic regimes. To put it differently, if someone 
examines the legislation of undemocratic regimes, either oligarchic or monarchic, he or she will 
understand that they lack preambles and that the way they treat people is fierce as already described. 
Apart from that, the preambles are essential for the aim of the Athenian, to impart virtue in the souls 
of the citizens. In other words, it is doubtful if he would be able to achieve his goal, namely to 
persuade people, if  his laws were just fierce and oppressive. 
To elucidate the true function of the laws and specifically the need for a preamble in them, the 
Athenian adduces an example with a doctor and a patient. There are two types of doctors the free and 
slave. On the one hand, the ‗free‘ (ἐιεύζεξνο) doctor is he who first gets the consent of the patient to 
heal him
141
. In addition he takes into consideration the unique characteristics of each patient after 
having discussed with his friends. Therefore he transforms him into ‗a docile man through persuasion‘ 
(κεηὰ πεηζνῦο ἡκεξνύκελνλ)142. In the same way, the lawgiver should try to convince people to abide 
by the laws. The ultimate aim of the legislator is the willing obedience of citizens to the law. 
                                                          
137
  Plato Laws 718 c8-10 
138
  Bartels (2014) 177 : ―The Athenian proposes to preface the law (λόκνο) with a ―preamble‖ (πξννίκηνλ), an 
idea he derives from contemporary musical practices. A musical λόκνοis customarily preceded by a πξννίκηνλ. 
The same ought to be done with regard to the political λόκνο‖. 
139
  Plato Laws 720 e4 
140
  Bartels (2014)  182-183 
141
  Plato  Laws 720 e1 
142
  Plato Laws 720 d9 
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Therefore this correlation of the preambles with the free doctor enhances the theory that they have a 
democratic connotation and that they would function better in such a type of governance. 
On the other hand, the slave doctor is he who acts in a paternalistic way. He enforces patients to 
accept his prescription under suppression. His etiquette, totally opposed to this of free doctor, is 
characterized as authoritarian, due to the fact that he deprives any opportunity for discussion with the 
patient
143
. Proportionately, a lawgiver who acts tyrannically enforces the law without asking what 
citizens believe about the enactment of laws. In other words, the constructive dialogue between the 
free doctor and his patients is absent from the slave doctor and lawgiver.  Therefore this type of 
legislation does not aim at persuading citizens and as a result it is not compatible with the purpose of 
Athenian already adduced, to make citizens ‗as persuadable as he possibly can‘ (ὡο εὐπεηζεζηάηνπο). 
However, what happens if citizens are unteachable and refuse to abide by the laws? In this case, ‗force‘ 
(βία) is the only road to the implementation of the laws. Therefore which is the answer to the question 
‗πεηζώ‘ or ‗βία’ ? I suggest that there is a combination of them depending on the circumstances. Of 
course all the interlocutors do have as priority the ‗persuasion‘ (πεηζώ) which is more close to a 
democratic state, as the lawgiver act in common with the citizens by exchanging opinions with them. 
The correlation with democracy lies in the fact that constructive dialogue constitutes an inherent 
characteristic of this governance. Nevertheless, in many occasions persuasion is not an effective 
method for the execution of laws. In this instance, ‗force‘ (βία) is called upon so as to enforce the 
laws.  
                                                                 BOOK V 
2.5.  Magnesia, a “pure” society? 
In this book the references or allusions to the governance of Magnesia are more restricted than those 
in the previous book. The biggest part of the book pertains with the duty of paying due honor to the 
soul, which is the most divine part of the man. Particularly the Athenian analyzes the ideal model of 
citizen in a state
144
. If people follow this road they will lead a happy life in mutual friendship with 
their fellow-citizens inasmuch as it is possible
145
. This recurrent piece of advice acts as a ‗preamble‘ 
(πξννίκηνλ) to persuade citizens to abide by the laws. However, after these exhortations certain 
democratic or undemocratic approaches do emerge, as the interlocutors discuss about the ‗sketch of 
the state organization‘ (πνιηηείαο ὑπνγξαθήλ)146. 
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  Bartels  (2014) 185 
144
  Plato Laws 729 d6-10 
145
  Plato Laws 743 c 7-9 : Ἀζελαῖνο: ἡκῖλ δὲ ἡ η῵λ λόκσλ ὑπόζεζηο ἐληαῦζα ἔβιεπελ, ὅπσο ὡο εὐδαηκνλέζηαηνη 
ἔζνληαη θαὶ ὅηη κάιηζηα ἀιιήινηο θίινη   (Now the fundamental purpose of our laws was this, that the citizens 
should be as happy as possible, and in the highest degree united in mutual friendship). Transl. Bury (1926) 
146
 Plato Laws 734 e 5 
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According to the Athenian, access to Magnesia will not be feasible to anyone. Particularly, citizens 
who are to form the colony will be scrutinized before being admitted, in a similar way to the 
separation of the sound from the unsound animals of a certain shepherd
147
. Firstly, citizens should 
undergo a ‗purge‘ (θαζαξκόο) in a similar way to the clearance of pool‘s water stemming from 
springs and torrents
148
.Through this parallelism the suggestion for a pure society is depicted. This 
‗purity‘ (θαζαξόηεο) of Magnesia has an elitist background as the acquisition of citizenship is 
possible only for pure people. In other words, people who do not meet the requirements of purity will 
not enter the Magnesia. However, the Athenian stresses that purging will not be very strict. What is 
more if we pore over the criteria of purity, we will understand that many people will be excluded from 
this in speech colony. But what exactly is this purge?  
According to the Athenian, the best purge is the most severe and ‗painful‘ (ἀιγεηλόο)149 and only ‗a 
lawgiver with despotic power‘ (λνκνζέηεο ηπξαλλίδνο) could apply such a purging150 that would 
result in the exclusion of incurable people from Magnesia or even their deaths. Such barriers are of 
course undemocratic. But again it is worth trying to examine the reason why Athenian aims at 
creating such a ―close‖ society as Popper would have argued. I propose that taking into consideration 
what has already been proposed, for instance the sovereignty of a best monarch or the emphasis on the 
skills and qualifications of people, it does make sense to put such obstacles to Magnesia. If we 
suppose that everyone would be welcome in Magnesia without any examination, then chances are that 
it would be very difficult to work in the way that the Athenian imagines its function. 
Moreover, in the ‗ἐλ ιόγῳ‘ colony this elitism is present, but it is not so harsh as it would be if the 
interlocutors had tried to establish an ‗actual‘ (ἔξγῳ) colony151. Specifically people who are regarded 
as ‗vicious‘ (θαθνί) should not be entitled to enter Magnesia. The core of elitism lies in the fact that 
such vicious people are excluded on beforehand. In addition, the term ‗θαθόο‘ is a very general one 
and as a result many people would not have the right to acquire citizenship. Of course all those 
restrictions were totally opposed to what was valid in the Athenian democracy. 
2.5.1. Wealthy and poor people in Magnesia: common interest? 
Inevitably, citizens who will enter Magnesia will come from different social classes and as a result 
some of them will be wealthier than the others. However, the Athenian tries to eliminate those 
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 Plato Laws 735b5-7:  Ἀζελαῖνο: δηαιέμαο δὲ ηά ηε ὑγη῅ θαὶ ηὰ κὴ θαὶ ηὰ γελλαῖα θαὶ ἀγελλ῅, (which is to 
separate the sound from the unsound, and the well-bred from the ill-bred). Transl. Bury (1926)   
148
 Plato Laws 736 b 1-7  
149
 Plato Laws 735 d 9 :  Ἀζελαῖνο:  ἔζηη δ᾽ ὁ κὲλ ἄξηζηνο ἀιγεηλόο  (The best purge is painful) 
150
 Plato Laws 735 d 3  
151
 Plato Laws 736b7-10 : Ἀζελαῖνο:ηὰ δ᾽ ἐπείπεξ ιόγῳ γ᾽ ἐζηὶλ ηὰ λῦλ ἀιι᾽ νὐθ ἔξγῳ πξαηηόκελα, πεπεξάλζσ 
ηε ἡκῖλ ἡ ζπιινγὴ θαὶ θαηὰ λνῦλ ἡ θαζαξόηεο αὐη῅ο ἔζησ ζπκβεβεθπῖα (Since, however, our present efforts are 
verbal rather than actual, let us assume that our collection of citizens is now completed, and its purity secured to 
our satisfaction;). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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discrepancies among citizens. Particularly, he envisages a society in which excessive poverty or 
wealth will be absent
152
. Of course the abolition of those two extremes has a strong political 
background. Aristotle in Politics claims characteristically that ―the real difference between democracy 
and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, that is an oligarchy, 
and where thepoor rule, that is democracy‖ 153 .Therefore as far as Magnesia is concerned the 
differentiations between wealthy and poor people will be significantly reduced and both of them will 
act in partnership in favor of the state. 
 In democratic Athens were existing wealth and poor citizens
154
, but this fact was not obstructing 
people from participating in the Assembly. However rich citizens who were not obliged to work for a 
living could afford more time to the political proceedings
155
. Why then the Athenian intended to 
abolish this distinction between rich and poor people? The answer to this question is very clear. First 
and foremost, Athenian‘s priority in Magnesia is not the acquisition of wealth but the development of 
virtues in people‘s souls and the sovereignty of law in the state. Besides, the doctrine of mediocrity 
that the Athenian espouses does not permit the existence of significant differences concerning the 
property of people. In addition to this, the predominance of extreme wealth can have an erosive 
influence on citizens as it can corrupt people. Consequently, even if this welfare of Magnesia may 
seem democratic, the reasons that urge the Athenian to make such a proposal are different. 
                                                                BOOK VI 
2.6. Εὐνομία in Magnesia 
The issue of a well-governed state (ηνῖο εὖ θεηκέλνηο λόκνηο)156 is a recurrent one throughout the Laws 
and is of course present also in this book. But what is the relationship between ‗εὐλνκία‘ and 
democratic or undemocratic governances? At this point, it should be clarified that εὐλνκία has a very 
broad semantic field as it can be associated both with democratic and undemocratic acts of ruling. In 
particular, the interpretation of εὐλνκία depends on the political color given to it by the people who 
use this term. Nevertheless, as far as the Laws are concerned it is very interesting to illustrate which 
kind of state the interlocutors regard as well-framed (εὐλνκνύκελνλ). 
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  Plato Laws 744 d 5-6  
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  Aristotle Politics  1279b34-80a4 
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  Ober (1989) 192: “The unequal distribution of wealth among citizens was perhaps the most politically 
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2.6.1. Magistrates and magistracies in Magnesia 
In Magnesia, mainly well-equipped people will be able to become magistrates and these people will 
be also tested after their election. It is worthy of note that apart from the close examination of 
magistrates, the selectors will be also persons who will have the background to fairly judge each 
candidate. As a result it is obvious that in their in speech colony each member of the society will have 
a specific role. If we take into account what was valid in classical democratic Athens where citizens 
used to possess authorities and magistracies by lot, we will understand that the proposal in the Laws 
concerning the acquisition of authorities is totally opposed to the Athenian one. In other words, in 
Magnesia the skills and the background of the nominees will play a pivotal role in the undertaking of 
authorities such as this of magistracy. It will not be so easy for people as in the classical Athens to 
possess such a significant authority
157
. The Athenian Stranger claims characteristically that (751c5-
d2) : 
ὁξᾶο γὰξ ὅηη πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ δεῖ ηνὺο ὀξζ῵ο ἰόληαο ἐπὶ 
ηὰο η῵λ ἀξρ῵λ δπλάκεηο βάζαλνλ ἱθαλὴλ αὐηνύο ηε 
θαὶ γέλνο ἑθάζησλ ἐθ παίδσλ κέρξη η῅ο αἱξέζεσο 
εἶλαη δεδσθόηαο, ἔπεηηα αὖ ηνὺο κέιινληαο 
αἱξήζεζζαη ηεζξάθζαη ηε ἐλ ἤζεζη λόκσλ εὖ 
πεπαηδεπκέλνπ πξὸο ηὸ δπζρεξαίλνληάο ηε θαὶ 
ἀπνδερνκέλνπο ὀξζ῵ο θξίλεηλ θαὶ ἀπνθξίλεηλ 
δπλαηνὺο γίγλεζζαη ηνὺο ἀμίνπο ἑθαηέξσλ.  
(You see that it is necessary, in the first place, that 
those who rightly undertake official functions should 
in every case have been fully tested- both themselves 
and their families- from their earliest years up to the 
time of their selection: and, secondly, that those who 
are to be the selectors should have been reared in law-
abiding habits, and be well trained for the task of 
rightly rejecting or accepting those candidates who 
deserve their approval or disapproval). 
Transl.  Bury (1926) 
 
The word βάζαλνο158 used by the Athenian illustrates this devotion to examine the background of 
each person that will undertake an authority. From a classical Athenian viewpoint this scrutiny is 
totally undemocratic and opposed to equality that used to provide the same chances to all the citizens. 
It is of significant importance to clarify that in this passage equality is interpreted as meritocracy 
or‗equality according to worth‘ (ηὸ θαη‘ ἀμίαλ) as Aristotle puts it159. Therefore, in order to establish a 
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  Stalley (1983) 114: ―But, although the citizens are enjoined to elect the best men, there are no institutional 
guarantees that only those who have proved themselves in this way will be elected. As Plato himself sees, the 
system will in the last resort depend on having citizens sufficiently well-educated to make the right choices‖ 
158
    LSJ (1961) 309 “ II generally, test, trial of genuineness” see also England (1921) 754d1 and 755d6 
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  Aristotle Politics 1301b: (―But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to 
worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal 
according to worth that which is equal by proportion2; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by 
an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 
2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree 
(as was said before) in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others 
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‗well-governed and well-framed‘ (εὐλνκνύκελνλ) state, the distribution of magistracies should be 
done after examining the qualifications of candidates. In other words, the authorities obtained in 
Magnesia will not result from lot but from the estimation of the skills that people are supposed to have. 
It is of crucial importance to clarify, that the distribution of many authorities, not only this of 
magistracies but also that of the commanders, will not be based on the lot. On the contrary, in each 
case people who are to possess an authority will undergo a judgment. As a result no one will 
randomly undertake an authority, but only due to the values that they expected to have. Throughout 
the Laws the practice of electing by lot is absent. Nevertheless, in many cases, such as this of the 
election of commanders, if someone believes that people who are nominates for this authority are not 
suitable for it, then he should propose the persons that he regards as proficient in this domain
160
.  
2.6.2. The boulē of Magnesia 
Another noteworthy feature is the existence of council in Magnesia which will consist of 360 persons. 
But in which way will these officials be elected? At this point emerges the quintessence of the Laws, 
namely that the selection of officials will combine both democratic and monarchic features. The 
Athenian Stranger declares this fact (756e10-12) 
 
2.6.3. What is equality? 
But what is the fundamental target of this council? The answer is equality. And what exactly is 
equality? At this point emerges the core of the Laws. Initially equality is divine and people are unable 
to entirely obtain it. People will be content if they possess a small part of it. The Athenian defines 
equality as (757c1-7): 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two 
principal varieties of constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy;). Transl. Rackham  (1932) 
160
  Plato Laws 755c10-d3 : ― Ἀζελαῖνο :ἐὰλ δέ ηηο ἄξα δνθῆ ηηλη η῵λ κὴ πξνβεβιεκέλσλ ἀκείλσλ εἶλαη η῵λ 
πξνβιεζέλησλ ηηλόο, ἐπνλνκάζαο ἀλζ᾽ ὅηνπ ὅληηλα πξνβάιιεηαη, ηνῦη᾽ αὐηὸ ὀκλὺο ἀληηπξνβαιιέζζσ ηὸλ 
ἕηεξνλ (And if anyone deems that someone of the men not nominated is betterthan one of those nominated, he 
shall state the name of his nominee and of the man whom he is to replace, and, taking the oath about the matter, 
he shall propose his substitute). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
ἡ κὲλ αἵξεζηο νὕησ γηγλνκέλε κέζνλ ἂλ ἔρνη κνλαξρηθ῅ο 
θαὶ δεκνθξαηηθ῅ο πνιηηείαο, ἧο ἀεὶ δεῖ κεζεύεηλ ηὴλ 
πνιηηείαλ. 
(The selection of officials that is thus made will form a 
mean between a monarchic constitution and a democratic; 
and midway between these our constitution should always 
stand).  
Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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Τῶ κὲλ γὰξ κείδνλη πιείσ, ηῶ δ᾽ ἐιάηηνλη ζκηθξόηεξα 
λέκεη, κέηξηα δηδνῦζα πξὸο ηὴλ αὐη῵λ θύζηλ 
ἑθαηέξῳ, θαὶ δὴ θαὶ ηηκὰο κείδνζη κὲλ πξὸο ἀξεηὴλ 
ἀεὶ κείδνπο, ηνῖο δὲ ηνὐλαληίνλ ἔρνπζηλ ἀξεη῅ο ηε θαὶ 
παηδείαο ηὸ πξέπνλ ἑθαηέξνηο ἀπνλέκεη θαηὰ ιόγνλ.  
(For it dispenses more to the greater and less to the 
smaller, giving due measure to each according to 
nature; and with regard to honors also, by granting the 
greater to those that are greater in goodness, and the 
less to those of the opposite character in respect of 
goodness and education, it assigns in proportion what 
is fitting to each. The selection of officials that is thus 
made will form a mean between a monarchic 
constitution and a democratic; and midway between 
these our constitution should always stand).  
Transl. Bury (1926) 
 
This definition of equality may transcend the strict bounds of democratic or oligarchic concepts 
already analyzed, as it emphasizes on the qualities of people, namely on virtue, education and nature. 
In other words people will be able to obtain so much power as their qualifications, their whole 
background permits. This type of equality is regarded as just. Besides, this equality should be the 
timeless aim of legislators who aim at establishing a new state. The Athenian Stranger explicitly states 
that (757d1-4): 
ἄιιελ ηε ἄλ πνηέ ηηο νἰθίδῃ, πξὸο ηαὐηὸλ ηνῦην 
ζθνπνύκελνλ ρξεὼλ λνκνζεηεῖλ, ἀιι᾽ νὐ πξὸο 
ὀιίγνπο ηπξάλλνπο ἢ πξὸο ἕλα ἢ θαὶ θξάηνο δήκνπ ηη, 
πξὸο δὲ ηὸ δίθαηνλ ἀεί 
( And whoever founds a State elsewhere at any time 
must make this same object the aim of his legislation, 
- not the advantage of a few tyrants, or of one, or of 
some form of democracy, but justice always).  
Transl. Bury (1926) 
 
Nevertheless, for the sake of avoidance of serious conflicts among citizens in a society this type of 
equality should be combined with the other type of equality, which uses the lot for the acquisition of 
authorities. Of course election by lot was a democratic element. Besides, the organization of the 
council that the Athenian Stranger proposes resembles this of the Athenian Council. Namely, the 
separation of the council in twelve parts, and specifically the fact that each part should bear certain 
responsibilities for approximately a month spontaneously calls into the mind the function of 
‗πξπηαλεύνπζα θπιή‘, that is to say the deanship of each of the ten tribes of Athens for 35 or 36 days. 
In general the combination of democratic with non-democratic elements is a recurrent theme 
throughout the Laws
161
. 
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2.6.4. The obligation of voting 
All the citizens are obliged to vote for the elections of officials, otherwise a financial penalty of ten 
drachmas will be imposed on them. Of course, as has already been stressed voting was not regarded as 
a democratic means of election. But what is new is the compulsion of voting. Apart from this, the 
members of the first two property classes are also forced to participate in the public Assembly. It is 
evident that coercion emerges again. Undoubtedly the act of forcing under the threat of punishment is 
very close to tyranny. Besides, it is very interesting that citizens from the lower or lowest classes will 
not be punished if they are absent from the public assembly
162
.   At this point may lurk an elitist 
element. Aristotle
163
 accuses Plato of crypto-oligarchy as ―he has set up a system in which the 
wealthier are encouraged, or rather obliged, to be more active politically while the less well off are 
encouraged to take only apassing interest in politics‖164 . In particular, the presence of these people is 
not regarded as essential in opposition to that of people from the first two classes. Therefore, in an 
implicit way the opinion of those people does not matter greatly as no one will punish them if they 
will be absent. 
 
2.6.5. Teachers and judges 
The role of education and justice is of paramount importance throughout the Laws. But what is 
interesting concerning the relation of them with democratic and undemocratic aspects is that only the 
best, the ‗ἄξηζηνη‘165 among the citizens of the state will be able to become teachers or judges. At this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
lot, mingling democratic with non-democratic methods, to secure mutual friendliness, in every rural and urban 
district, so that all may be as unanimous as possible). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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 Plato Laws 764a3-7 : Ἀζελαῖνο :ἴησ δ᾽ εἰο ἐθθιεζίαλ θαὶ ηὸλ θνηλὸλ ζύιινγνλ ὁ βνπιόκελνο, ἐπάλαγθεο δ᾽ 
ἔζησ ηῶ η῵λ δεπηέξσλ θαὶ πξώησλ ηηκεκάησλ, δέθα δξαρκαῖο δεκηνπκέλῳ ἐὰλ κὴ παξὼλ ἐμεηάδεηαη ηνῖο 
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being fined ten drachmae).  Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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factors are taken from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This 
appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their selection by lot from a list 
previously elected by vote is a feature common to both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon 
the richer citizens to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political function, while 
the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavor to secure that a majority of the 
magistrates shall be drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the 
classes assessed by wealth) . Transl. Rackham (1932) 
164
  Gottesman (2014) 186 
165
 Plato Laws  767d2 : Ἀζελαῖνο :ὃο ἂλ ἐλ ἀξρῆ ἑθάζηῃ ἄξηζηόο ηε εἶλαη δόμῃ θαὶ ἄξηζη᾽ ἂλ θαὶ ὁζηώηαηα ηὰο 
δίθαο ηνῖο πνιίηαηο αὐηῶ ηὸλ ἐπηόληα ἐληαπηὸλ θαίλεηαη δηαθξίλεηλ. (That member of each body whom they 
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point the elitism of the Athenian comes again to the surface. Particularly people will select by vote 
those who they believe that they excel either in judging or in teaching in order to assume the office of 
judge or teacher. What is more, after their election both the judges and teachers will be closely 
examined so as to ascertain their merit
166
. In case they be found disqualified they will be removed. 
2.6.6. A “true” marriage 
Despite the fact that the above mentioned title may sound peculiar, as its relation with democratic and 
undemocratic aspects is not evident at first glance, i will try to elucidate its deep political background. 
Hereon, the Athenian proposes that men should not get married the girl that they fall in love with, as 
he characteristically states ‗νὐ ηὸλ ἥδηζηνλ αὑηῶ‘167. The criterion of a marriage should be the benefit 
of the state and in this sense people should give careful thought to the choice of the right spouse for 
the achievement of this goal. Of course the Athenian overstates that this fact cannot be enacted 
through written laws; he is not able to force a man to marry a specific kind of girl. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that the Athenian does not leave much room for personal choice without guidance even in the 
realm of love. Therefore, there is a fierce suppression of personal option, a strict repression to love in 
favor of the state.  
                                                                  BOOK VII 
2.7. Censorship in feasts 
As the dialogue unfolds another undemocratic element emerges. This feature is censorship, as people 
who will participate in the feasts of the state will not be able to present new dances or hymns. This 
rejection of new proposals in the feasts is explicitly stated by the Athenian
168
. In addition to this, 
children should not try innovations in their games. By the way, it is very interesting that the participle 
λεσηεξίδνληαο that the Athenian uses for this occasion of ‗παηδηά‘ originates from the verb λεσηεξίδσ 
which was commonly used for those who attempted to subvert a regime
169
. All these barriers to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deem the best man and the most likely to decide the suits for his fellow citizens during the ensuing year in the 
best and holiest way). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
166
 Plato Laws 767d5: Ἀζελαῖνο :Τνύησλ δὲ αἱξεζέλησλ γίγλεζζαη κὲλ δνθηκαζίαλ ἐλ ηνῖο ἑινκέλνηο αὐηνῖο, ἐὰλ 
δὲ ἀπνδνθηκαζζῆ ηηο, ἕηεξνλ ἀλζαηξεῖζζαη θαηὰ ηαὐηά. (These being chosen , they shall undergo a scrutiny 
before those who have chosen them; and should any be disqualified, they shall choose a substitute in like 
manner). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
167
 Plato Laws 773b6:  Ἀζελαῖνο :θαὶ θαηὰ παληὸο εἷο ἔζησ κῦζνο γάκνπ˙ ηὸλ γὰξ ηῆ πόιεη δεῖ ζπκθέξνληα 
κλεζηεύεηλ γάκνλ ἕθαζηνλ, νὐ ηὸλ ἥδηζηνλ αὑηῶ. (each man must seek to form such a marriage as shall benefit 
the State, rather than such as best pleases himself). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
168
 Plato Laws 799b6-9:  Ἀζελαῖνο :  ἂλ δὲ παξ᾽ αὐηά ηίο ηῳ ζε῵λ ἄιινπο ὕκλνπο ἢ ρνξείαο πξνζάγῃ, ηνὺο 
ἱεξέαο ηε θαὶ ηὰο ἱεξείαο κεηὰ λνκνθπιάθσλ ἐμείξγνληαο ὁζίσο ἐμείξγεηλ θαὶ θαηὰ λόκνλ, ηὸλ δὲ ἐμεηξγόκελνλ 
(And if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses will be 
acting in accordance with both religion and law, when with the help of the Law-wardens, they expel him from 
the feast).  Transl.  Bury (1926) 
169
 LSJ (1961) 1172: ― II. esp. attempt political changes, make revolutionary movements, ηνῖο ἀηπρνῦζη 
λεσηεξίδεηλ ζπκθέξεη Antipho 2.4.9; ἀπὸ κόλεο λ. η῅ο ἀζπίδνο Critias 37 D.; πξὸο ηνὺο μπκκάρνπο 
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new could be characterized as undemocratic and specifically authoritative or blinkered. For instance, 
one significant accusation of Popper against Plato is that he condemns every change. He argues that 
according to Plato ―Change is evil, rest divine‖170. But even if this is true it is worth trying to illustrate 
the reason why the Athenian puts such barriers to the changes in ‗ρνξεία‘ or ‗παηδηά‘. 
Firstly, we should seriously take into account that ‗ρνξεία‘, namely the practice of choral singing and 
dancing, was playing a pivotal role in the shape of the ideal citizen in the Laws
171
. This fact is 
corroborated in the second book of the Laws, where the Athenian mentions that an educated man is 
also fully-choir trained as he knows very well to dance and sing
172
. Apart from this, true ‗ρνξεία‘ in 
the Laws is supposed to have a calming effect on people‘s soul173. Having all these facts into his mind 
the Athenian could not trust the formation of ‗ρνξεία‘ to anyone but only to connoisseurs. In other 
words, in the same way as he does not allow the citizens to learn whatever they want so he restricts 
them in the case of ‗ρνξεία‘. Apart from all these, we should take into consideration the specific 
context of hymns and songs in this book. To be more accurate, the key word is the infinitive 
θαζηεξ῵ζαη that the Athenian uses174. The songs will have the form of a hymn to a god175, so people 
will not be able to diverge from the frames of this model. 
Furthermore strict limits are put to poetry. Poets should not diverge from the boundaries marked by 
the state concerning justice, legitimacy or righteousness. In addition, if the Law-wardens have not 
approved of the poem, the poet himself will not be entitled to recite his poem even to a person. But 
which is the reason for these limits set to poetry? The cause of this fierce restriction of poets is again 
the same; namely, that if they interpret justice in a different way than this that has already been 
defined by the state then they will have an erosive influence on people‘s souls and minds and then the 
stability and coherence of the state will be put in danger. Therefore, the poets should create works 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
λεσηεξίδνληαο Th.1.97, cf. 102; λ. ἔξγῳ Id.3.66; λεσηεξίδεηλ ἐβνύιεην ἐο ηὸ πι῅ζνο Lys.20.16; ηὸ λεσηεξίδνλ 
the revolutionary party, J.BJProoem. 2; λεσηεξίζαη ηὴλ πνιηηείαλ revolutionize the state, Th.1.115:—Pass., 
ἐλεσηεξίδεην ηὰ πεξὶ ηὴλ ὀιηγαξρίαλ Id.8.73, cf. 4.76.‖ 
170
 Popper (1945) 86: ―The idealist formula is: Arrest all political change! Change is evil, rest divine. All 
change can be arrested if the state is made an exact copy of its original, i.e. of the Form or Idea of the city.‖ 
171
  Calame (2013) 89: ―Insofar, as in Plato‘s Laws, musical and gymnastic education holds a central role in the 
education of the ideal citizen‖ 
172
  Plato Laws 654a7-b2: Ἀζελαῖνο :νὐθνῦλ ὁ κὲλ ἀπαίδεπηνο ἀρόξεπηνο ἡκῖλ ἔζηαη, ηὸλ δὲ πεπαηδεπκέλνλ 
ἱθαλ῵ο θερνξεπθόηα ζεηένλ; (Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without choir-training,?). Transl.  
Bury (1926) 
173
   Moutsopoulos (2002) 118: ―In Plato‘s theory, music has a calming effect….The Laws – more than any other 
late Platonic dialogue – is the work in which, as Plato studies the world of the human soul (and as he had 
already written in theBook III of the Republic), the principle of musical motion, in all its various forms, 
occupies a key position, playing a central role in resolving the contradictions between material and spiritual, 
natural and physiological, medical and educative, individual and collective.‖ 
174
 Plato Laws 799a2-8 : Ἀζελαῖνο :ηνῦ θαζηεξ῵ζαη π᾵ζαλ κὲλ ὄξρεζηλ πάληαδὲκέιε…κεηὰ δὲ ηνῦην ἐπὶ ηνῖο 
η῵λ ζε῵λ ζύκαζηλ ἑθάζηνηο ἣλ ᾠδὴλ δεῖ ἐθπκλεῖζζαη, θαὶ ρνξείαηο πνίαηζηλ γεξαίξεηλ ηὴλ ηόηε  ζπζίαλ (The 
device of consecrating all dancing and all music… and they should ordain next what hymn is to be sung at each 
of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances each such sacrifice is to be graced). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
175
 Calame (2013)  97: ―This means that dances and melodies will have a sacred character ( kathierosai, 799a) 
and that the different choral manifestations will be organised according to the calendar of religious forms.‖ 
42 
 
conducive to the firmness of the state. It is useful to adduce the passage in question so as to see the 
extent of the censorship. So, the proposal of the Athenian in (801c11-d4) is that: 
ηὸλ πνηεηὴλ παξὰ ηὰ η῅ο πόιεσο λόκηκα θαὶ δίθαηα ἢ 
θαιὰ ἢ ἀγαζὰ κεδὲλ πνηεῖλ ἄιιν, ηὰ δὲ πνηεζέληα κὴ 
ἐμεῖλαη η῵λ ἰδηση῵λ κεδελὶ πξόηεξνλ δεηθλύλαη, πξὶλ 
ἂλ αὐηνῖο ηνῖο πεξὶ ηαῦηα ἀπνδεδεηγκέλνηο θξηηαῖο θαὶ 
ηνῖο λνκνθύιαμηλ δεηρζῆ θαὶ ἀξέζῃ. 
(The poet shall compose nothing which goes beyond 
the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, 
fair and good; nor shall he show his compositions to 
any private person until they have first been shown to 
the judges appointed to deal with these matters and to 
the Law-wardens, and have been approved by them). 
Transl.  Bury (1926) 
 
Of course it is worth reminding the famous passage from the third book of the Republic in which 
Socrates forbids to certain artists, one of them is Homer, to present heroes instilled with flaws in their 
character, such as cowardice, servility
176
. For instance Socrates said that Homer should not have 
presented Achilles to weep and lament after hearing Patroclus‘s death. But which is the reason for this 
intervention to the work of poetry?  The cause of this censorship is in line with what is in effect in the 
Laws. Accurately, heroes should constitute role models for people that will implant them the right 
qualities. In this way, people will be inspired through the right models and they will mold a virtuous 
character that will be useful to Kallipolis. 
Apart from all these facts, the apogee of the censorship culminates in the exclusion of poets. This 
barring takes place both in the Republic and Laws. But why? The reason for the exclusion of poets 
from Callipolis is given in the tenth book of Republic. Poetry is regarded as purely imitative and as a 
result remote from truth
177
. This imitative poetry is supposed to have an erosive influence on people‘s 
soul and reason
178
. As far as the Laws are concerned, the cause of keeping the tragic poets out from 
                                                          
176
 Plato Republic 388a-b : Σσθξάηεο: πάιηλ δὴ Ὁκήξνπ ηε δεεζόκεζα θαὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ πνηεη῵λ κὴ πνηεῖλ 
Ἀρηιιέα ζε᾵ο παῖδα—―ἄιινη᾽ ἐπὶ πιεπξ᾵ο θαηαθείκελνλ, ἄιινηε δ᾽ αὖηε ὕπηηνλ, ἄιινηε δὲ πξελ῅, ... 
 ―ηνηὲ δ᾽ ὀξζὸλ ἀλαζηάληα πισΐδνλη᾽† ἀιύνλη᾽ ἐπὶ‖―ζῖλ᾽ ἁιὸο ἀηξπγέηνην,‖ κεδὲ ―ἀκθνηέξαηζηλ ρεξζὶλ ἑιόληα 
θόληλ αἰζαιόεζζαλ ρεπάκελνλ θὰθ θεθαι῅ο‖-γεγνλόηα ιηηαλεύνληά ηε θαὶ— ... θπιηλδόκελνλ θαηὰ θόπξνλ, 
ἐμνλνκαθιήδελ ὀλνκάδνλη᾽ ἄλδξα ἕθαζηνλ.  (We should be right,‖ said he. ―Again then we shall request Homer 
and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as,Lying now on his side, and then again on his 
back, And again on his face, norclutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head,nor as 
weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam, near kinsman of 
the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung, Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing. 
And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying). Trans. 
Shorey (1930) 
177
  Tate  (1928) 16 : ―Now the tenth book  attacks  all  'imitative' poetry (ὅζε κηκεηηθή, 595a) as remote from 
truth, and excludes it from the state because of its pernicious influence.‖ 
178
  Plato Republic 595b2: Σσθξάηεο: ὡο κὲλ πξὸο ὑκ᾵ο εἰξ῅ζζαη—νὐ γάξ κνπ θαηεξεῖηε πξὸο ηνὺο η῅ο 
ηξαγῳδίαο πνηεηὰο θαὶ ηνὺο ἄιινπο ἅπαληαο ηνὺο κηκεηηθνύο—ιώβε ἔνηθελ εἶλαη πάληα ηὰ ηνηαῦηα η῅ο η῵λ 
ἀθνπόλησλ δηαλνίαο, ὅζνη κὴ ἔρνπζη θάξκαθνλ ηὸ εἰδέλαη αὐηὰ νἷα ηπγράλεη ὄληα. (Why, between ourselves—
for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption of 
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Magnesia has the same background as in the Republic. In particular, the Athenian claims 
characteristically that Magnesia is κίκεζηο ηνῦ θαιιίζηνπ θαὶ ἀξίζηνπ βίνπ ὃ δή θακελ ἡκεῖο γε ὄλησο 
εἶλαη ηξαγῳδίαλ ηὴλ ἀιεζεζηάηελ179. Therefore, in Magnesia there would be no need for presenting 
tragedies as the state itself presents the best life and in addition the tragic poets of Magnesia are they 
themselves the best ἡκεῖο ἐζκὲλ ηξαγῳδίαο αὐηνὶ πνηεηαὶ θαηὰ δύλακηλ ὅηη θαιιίζηεο ἅκα θαὶ 
ἀξίζηεο180. In addition, the harmful influence of tragedy on people‘s soul is also stressed in the 
Laws
181
. 
However, in the Laws, the Athenian is not adamant on the exclusion of tragic poets from Magnesia. 
On the contrary, he leaves room for such poets on condition that their ‗chants‘ (ᾠδαί) are of equal 
quality or better than these established in Magnesia
182. I suggest that again the line of Athenian‘s 
thought is the same, and that is the devotion to the interest of the state. In other words, the fact that the 
Athenian would make an exemption only for poets of high quality can be explained by his intention to 
benefit from such poets. And which is exactly the profit? Apparently the beneficial influence that such 
chants supposed to have on people‘s souls and by extension on the state. In addition, the fact that the 
Athenian would accept only distinguished poets that are supposed to contribute to Magnesia can be 
characterized as elitist.   
Consequently, even if this obligation about poetry could be termed as undemocratic, the background 
of its application remains exactly the same. Poetry, similarly to ρνξεία, is supposed to be a significant 
educational means in the Laws and as a result strict frames should be put to its content and 
teaching.Following this road, citizens will be able to contribute to the state. We should not overlook 
the fact that all the educational system in the Laws serves the interest of the state. This total devotion 
to the state is explicitly stated by the Athenian (804d1-8). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote a knowledge of its real nature). Transl. Shorey 
(1930) 
179
 Plato Laws 817b3-4: Ἀζελαῖνο : π᾵ζα νὖλ ἡκῖλ ἡ πνιηηεία ζπλέζηεθε κίκεζηο ηνῦ θαιιίζηνπ θαὶ ἀξίζηνπ 
βίνπ.  (all our polity is framed as a representation of the fairest and best life, as we assert, the truest tragedy). 
Trans. Bury (1926) 
180
 Plato Laws 817b1-3: Ἀζελαῖνο : ἡκεῖο ἐζκὲλ ηξαγῳδίαο αὐηνὶ πνηεηαὶ θαηὰ δύλακηλ ὅηη θαιιίζηεο ἅκα θαὶ 
ἀξίζηεο (we ourselves, to the best of our ability, are the authors of a tragedy at once superlatively fair and good)
  
181
  Plato Laws  817c9-d1: Ἀζελαῖνο :ζρεδὸλ γάξ ηνη θἂλ καηλνίκεζα ηειέσο ἡκεῖο ηε θαὶ ἅπαζα ἡ πόιηο (In 
truth, both we ourselves and the whole Statewould be absolutely mad). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
182
  Plato Laws 817d7-9: Ἀζελαῖνο :ἂλ κὲλ ηὰ αὐηά γε ἢ θαὶ βειηίσ ηὰ παξ᾽ ὑκ῵λ θαίλεηαη ιεγόκελα, δώζνκελ 
ὑκῖλ ρνξόλ, εἰ δὲ κή, ὦ θίινη, νὐθ ἄλ πνηε δπλαίκεζα. (and if your utterances seem to be the same as ours or 
better, then we will grant you a chorus, but if not, my friends, we can never do so). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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ἐλ δὲ ηνύηνηο π᾵ζηλ δηδαζθάινπο ἑθάζησλ 
πεπεηζκέλνπο κηζζνῖο νἰθνῦληαο μέλνπο δηδάζθεηλ ηε 
πάληα ὅζα πξὸο ηὸλ πόιεκόλ ἐζηηλ καζήκαηα ηνὺο 
θνηη῵ληαο ὅζα ηε πξὸο κνπζηθήλ, νὐρ ὃλ κὲλ ἂλ ὁ 
παηὴξ βνύιεηαη, θνηη῵ληα, ὃλ δ᾽ ἂλ κή, ἐ῵ληα ηὰο 
παηδείαο, ἀιιὰ ηὸ ιεγόκελνλ πάλη᾽ ἄλδξα θαὶ παῖδα 
θαηὰ ηὸ δπλαηόλ, ὡο η῅ο πόιεσο κ᾵ιινλ ἢ η῵λ 
γελλεηόξσλ ὄληαο, παηδεπηένλ ἐμ ἀλάγθεο. 
(In all these establishments there should reside 
teachers attracted by pay from abroad for each several 
subject, to instruct the pupils in all matters relating to 
war and to music; And no father shall either send his 
son as a pupil or keep him away from the training-
school at his own sweet will, but every ―man jack‖ of 
them all (as the saying goes) must, so far as possible, 
be compelled to be educated, inasmuch as they are 
children of the State even more than children of their 
parents).  
Transl.  Bury (1926) 
 
 
2.7.1. Women and men: equal beings 
The fact that women in the Laws are not treated as lesser beings than men is of course worthy of 
analysis as it is strictly correlated with democratic and undemocratic aspects. Women in Magnesia 
would receive the same education as men
183
. From a modern point of view this equality is totally 
democratic. But in that era, when the Laws were written, this was not exactly the case. Particularly, in 
democratic Athens women were very restricted and their main role was this of wife and mother. They 
did not receive education except for domestic training
184
. In opposition to Athens, in ancient Sparta 
there was a common educational system for boys and girls, of course very different from this of 
Athens
185
. But even so, in Sparta women were not deprived of the educational system. Taking into 
account all this information could we say that Athenian‘s proposal could be characterized as favorably 
disposed toSparta and in turn undemocratic? Of course no! This is not the case since the Athenian 
criticizes both Athens
186
 and Sparta
187
 about the way they treat women.   
                                                          
183
 Plato Laws 805c8-d: Ἀζελαῖνο :ηὸ δ᾽ ἡκέηεξνλ δηαθέιεπκα ἐλ ηνύηνηο νὐθ ἀπνζβήζεηαη ηὸ κὴ νὐ ιέγεηλ ὡο 
δεῖ παηδείαο ηε θαὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ ὅηη κάιηζηα θνηλσλεῖλ ηὸ ζ῅ιπ γέλνο ἡκῖλ ηῶ η῵λ ἀξξέλσλ γέλεη. (nor shall we be 
hereby precluded from asserting in our doctrine that the female sexmust share with the male, to the greatest 
extent possible, both in education and in all else). Transl. Bury (1926) 
184
O'Neal William J., (1993)  117: ―In Athens, for the most part, women were legal nonentities whom the Greek 
male excluded from any participation in the political or intellectual life of the city. Generally, women did not 
attend school and did not learn to read and write. According to one scholarly view, they were uneducated except 
for domestic training; they were virtually imprisoned in their homes.‖ 
185
 Pomeroy (2002) 3: ―Only at Sparta did the state prescribe an educational program for both boys and girls 
beginning in childhood.‖ 
186
 Plato Laws 805a3-5: Ἀζελαῖνο :θεκί, εἴπεξ ηαῦηα νὕησ ζπκβαίλεηλ ἐζηὶλ δπλαηά, πάλησλ ἀλνεηόηαηα ηὰ λῦλ 
ἐλ ηνῖο παξ᾽ ἡκῖλ ηόπνηο γίγλεζζαη ηὸ κὴ πάζῃ ῥώκῃ πάληαο ὁκνζπκαδὸλ ἐπηηεδεύεηλ ἄλδξαο γπλαημὶλ ηαὐηά. 
(Since this state of things can exist, I affirm that the practice which at present prevails in our districts is a most 
irrational one—namely, that men and women should not all follow the same pursuits with one accord and with 
all their might). Transl. Bury (1926) 
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Having in mind all these facts, i suggest that what the Athenian proposes is that women should be 
educated in order to be able to help the state. In other words, the Athenian is able to understand that 
women and men are different but not unequal beings. As a result women should try to act in favor of 
the state. If women achieve such a goal then they will be praised in exactly the same way as men
188
. 
The fact that women will be praised entails that they are regarded as capable of contributing to the 
state. Therefore, women in the Laws even if they are not supposed equal to men, they are undoubtedly 
treated in a better way than women in democratic Athens where they were restricted in their house 
and they were not able to participate in the Assembly
189
. 
                                                                   BOOK VIII 
2.8. Censorship in the festivals 
Apart from the censorship upon poetry already analyzed, it is remarkable that according to the 
Athenian the speeches made in the ‗noble games‘ (παηδηάο) should also be censored. So many 
intellectual activities will be censored
190
. Namely, children who will either excel or do badly in these 
games should be praised or blamed respectively.The content of these speeches should be authorized 
by the ‗law-wardens‘ (λνκνθύιαθεο) and ‗educators‘ (παηδεπηαί). In corroboration of this fact, the 
proposal of the Athenian that ‗nor yet shall anyone venture to sing an unauthorized song‘ 191 
demonstrates the existence of censorship in these games. What is more the creation of these speeches 
should be assigned to people who have the background to do so and not to everyone πνηεηὴο δὲ ἔζησ 
η῵λ ηνηνύησλ κὴ ἅπαο192. So except for censorship, emerges again the exclusion of people who are 
regarded as unsuitable for this issue. 
2.8.1 The innovative polity of Magnesia 
At this point the Athenian Stranger criticizes harshly all the different kinds of authorities that he has 
already investigated with his interlocutors. His main two indictments are the lust for wealth and the 
lack of proper military training that plagued those societies. In particular, he does not espouse 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
187
 Plato Laws 806a-c( See all these three paragraphs a, b, c, the main indictment against Sparta is that women 
are excluded from participating in the war).  
188
 Plato Laws 802a4-6: Ἀζελαῖνο : ηαῦηα δὲ πάληα ἡκῖλ ἔζησ θνηλὰ ἀλδξάζηλ ηε θαὶ γπλαημὶλ ἀγαζνῖο θαὶ 
ἀγαζαῖο δηαθαλ῵ο γελνκέλνηο. (All such honors shall be equally shared by women as well as men who have 
been conspicuous for their excellence). Transl. Bury (1926) 
189
 Gottesman (2014) 182: “In Magnesia, women might not achieve full equality with men but they are full 
participants in the public sphere, as both objects and agents of praise and blame. Not only do they participate 
in the city’s dining clubs and choruses, but it also seems that they are expected to serve in the army, attend 
the Assembly (although that is more controversial), and serve as magistrates”. 
190
 Popper (1945) 86-87: ―There must be a censorship of all intellectual activities of the ruling class, and a 
continual propaganda aiming at molding and unifying their minds. All innovation in education, legislation, and 
religion must be prevented or suppressed.‖ 
191
 Plato Laws 829d8-9 
192
 Plato Laws 829c7-8 
46 
 
democracy or oligarchy or tyranny, as he defines those governmental systems as ‗ζηαζησηεῖαη‘193 . He 
claims that in ζηαζησηεῖαη rulers and ruled do not coexist harmoniously on their own will. On the 
contrary, people who possess authority enforce their own rules taking into account their own interest. 
In addition, they do not want ruled people to acquire wealth and bravery in war as they afraid of 
losing their power. Such acts of ruling seem abhorrent to the eyes of the Athenian as they have a 
corrosive influence on the citizens. Therefore, the colony that he aims to establish will be free from 
such defects. But how exactly does he envisage his in speech colony? 
The answer to this question will shed more light on the relationship of Magnesia‘s polity with 
democratic and undemocratic aspects in the Laws. It is very interesting that both the young men and 
women will have to undergo hard military training in their daily life. As the Athenian declares the 
men of Magnesia ‗must train for war not in war-time but while they are living in peace‘194. Apart from 
this, young men and women should learn how to harness their desires which many times plunge them 
into ruin. The sense of ‗ὕϐξηο‘ 195should not be vanished as in the above mentioned societies. But does 
this hard and severe way of life resemble the Spartan modus vivendi
196
, which involved many 
undemocratic features and less democratic? 
At this point it is useful to clarify that the Laws do not constitute an idealization of ancient Sparta or 
Athens
197
. In other words, the fact that the interlocutors may acclaim some Athenian or Spartan 
features as beneficial for Magnesia, does not entail that they espouse the whole socio-political 
structure of these cities. Hereon despite the fact that there are indeed many common characteristics 
with the Spartan way of life, for instance the fierce military training or the compulsory education of 
children or the endurance against pleasures
198
 , the Spartan organization is not perceived as a blueprint 
for Magnesia. Besides, we should always bear in mind that Plato was strongly opposed to the special 
emphasis that the Spartan educational system used to put on war as he aimed at the cultivation of 
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virtue in people‘s souls199. Therefore it is not wise to try to identify social and political features of 
Sparta or Athens with these that exposed in the Laws for ‗Magnesia‘. 
In this book, this fierce training and in general the compulsion that proposed in many cases, such as 
this of education or sex desires, can be characterized as undemocratic, as people are deprived of their 
free will. In other words, there is a strict submission to the authority without taking into account that 
many citizens may not agree with these laws. Additionally, it is remarkable that this toughness of the 
Athenian remains stable in the investigation of punishing people. A telling example is that concerning 
the punishment of slaves. In particular, he states in (845a1-4): 
ἐὰλ δὲ δὴ δνῦινο κὴ πείζαο ηὸλ δεζπόηελ η῵λ ρσξίσλ 
ἅπηεηαί ηνπ η῵λ ηνηνύησλ, θαηὰ ῥ᾵γα βνηξύσλ θαὶ 
ζῦθνλ ζπθ῅ο ἰζαξίζκνπο πιεγὰο ηνύηνηο 
καζηηγνύζζσ. 
(And if a slave, without the consent of the master of 
the plots, touches any of such fruit, he shall be beaten 
with stripes as many as the grapes in the bunch or the 
figs on the figtree). 
 Transl.  Bury (1926) 
 
This passage reflects the strictness of the Athenian concerning the punishment of slaves. If they get 
caught touching grapes without the license of the lord they should receive equal stripes as the number 
of the figs of the tree. This way of punishing does not try to explain to the offender that he should 
have asked for the the permission of the master. On the contrary it is based on the fear of the 
wrongdoer. The offernder is supposed not to commit the same wrong again due to the fear of this 
tough punishment and this hard punishment will act as a deterrent to potential wrongdoers. The 
conversation about punishment paves the way for the next book where this topic will be thoroughly 
examined. 
                                                                   BOOK  IX 
2.9. Judgement and punishment in the Laws 
How could the acts of punishing and administering justice in Magnesia be related with democratic or 
undemocratic aspects in the Laws? Before giving a fulfilling answer to this question I would like to 
highlight the semantic difference between the words ‗punishment‘ (ηηκσξία) and ‗judgement‘ (δίθε) 
as it is explicitly stated in the fifth book of the Laws (728c1-5). 
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θαιὸλ γὰξ ηό γε δίθαηνλ θαὶ ἡ δίθε—ηηκσξία δέ, 
ἀδηθίαο ἀθόινπζνο πάζε, ἧο ὅ ηε ηπρὼλ θαὶ κὴ 
ηπγράλσλ ἄζιηνο, ὁ κὲλ νὐθ ἰαηξεπόκελνο, ὁ δέ, ἵλα 
ἕηεξνη πνιινὶ ζῴδσληαη, ἀπνιιύκελνο. 
for justice and judgment are things honorable , but a 
punishment, an infliction that follows on injustice; 
both he that undergoes this and he that undergoes it 
not are alike wretched,—the one in that he remains 
uncured, the other in that he is destroyed in order to 
secure the salvation of many others). 
 Trans. Bury (1926) 
 
According to the Athenian δίθε is supposed to have a positive connotation. To shed light on this, it is 
helpful to refer to the work Gorgias of Plato where it is stressed that δίθε has a view to reformation, 
to the cure of the offender. Accurately, Socrates mentions that ‗I suppose, the justice of the court 
reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as a medicine for wickedness‘ (ζσθξνλίδεη γάξ πνπ θαὶ 
δηθαηνηέξνπο πνηεῖ θαὶ ἰαηξηθὴ γίγλεηαη πνλεξίαο ἡ δίθε.)200. On the contrary the meaning of ηηκσξία 
in the Laws is more close to what we today call retribution
201
. Τηκσξία does not aim at curing people 
as those who undergo such a punishment are not cured but remain wretched
202
. 
The dividing line between punishment or retribution and true judgement in the Laws can be illustrated 
by the metaphor of the free and slave doctor that is used in the fourth
203
 and in the ninth book
204
. 
Accurately a free doctor is he who does not treat his patients in a paternalistic way, but tries to find in 
cooperation with themthe best possible remedy. On the other hand a slave doctor is he who according 
to his experience suppresses patients to apply his remedy. Similarly to the way that a free doctor acts, 
also true judgement aims at persuading the citizen to consciously abide by the laws. On the contrary, 
punishment does not intend to convince citizens but to oppress them to conform to the laws under the 
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fear of death penalty. Consequently, what I suggest is that such a punishment as the capital one ‗does 
not school citizens‘ (νὐ παηδεύεη ηνὺο πνιίηαο)205, but aims at warning them (παξάδεηγκα κὲλ ηνῦ κὴ 
ἀδηθεῖλ ηνῖο ἄιινηο)206 through fear to obey the laws.  
 To have a more thorough understanding of the meaning of ηηκσξία in the Laws it is worth examining 
the first dialogue in which Plato discusses about ηηκσξία and is in line with the Laws. In his work 
Protagoras the homonymous sophist claims that no one punishes simply for the sake of what 
happened in the past, as such a punishment (ηηκσξία) constitutes a blind vengeance. In opposition to 
this kind of a punishment, a rational man is supposed to punish with a view to prevent criminals from 
repeating their crimes and deter potential criminals from committing a crime
207
. In the same way, 
‗punishment‘ (ηηκσξία) in the Laws is a means of deterring offenders from wrongdoing. Capital 
punishment for instance works in this way, as potential criminals may not commit a crime under the 
fear of punishment
208
. 
What is more the Athenian‘s proposal that people who perpetrate crimes can be either incurable or 
curable.The former act either ‗voluntarily‘ (ἑθνπζίσο) whilst the latter ‗involuntarily‘ (ἀθνπζίσο). To 
be more precise, criminals who wrong voluntarily are supposed to be incurable, because despite the 
fact that they have received the true education, they still remain sacrilegious (ἱεξόζπινη), or still 
commit wrongs against their parents (πεξὶ γνλέαο ἠδηθεθώο) and the state (πεξὶ πόιηλ ἠδηθεθώο). In 
Magnesia those incurable people should be put to death
209
. Of course capital punishment was more 
fact than fiction both in Athens and Sparta. But I do not want to focus on death penalty per se but on 
the reason why it is proposed in the Laws. In other words, the idea that in Magnesia there will be no 
room for people who suffer from intractable mental diseases seems to approach the proposal for a 
‗pure‘ society which excludes such people.  
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Specifically, the approach of the Athenian concerning the so called incurable criminals is instilled 
with an authoritarian way of thinking. This authoritarianism is demonstrated by the fact that those 
incurable people (ἀλίαηνη) are deprived of a second chance. Former convicts are not able to reenter the 
Magnesia and act as useful members of it. In other words, the quintessence of Plato‘s absolutism lies 
in the fact that he is taking irrevocable decisions and that he also takes for granted that those people 
cannot be cured. Consequently, Plato seems to propose that there are some people who are not able to 
be taught, as despite the fact that they received ‗education‘ (παηδεία) and ‗nurture‘ (ηξνθή)210 they 
voluntarily harm other people or do wrongs. Therefore this background of punishing people is 
inculcated with totalitarianism. 
Except for all these facts I would also like to shed light on an issue that at first glance seems puzzling. 
To be more precise, the social and political status of the criminal plays a pivotal role in the infliction 
of a penalty. In other words, different kinds of punishment are imposed on slaves than these inflicted 
on citizens
211
. But does this fact constitute a violation of equality before the law (ἰζνλνκία)?  The 
answer to this question will highlight the background of Plato‘s way of thinking concerning 
punishment. Initially, taking into account the legislation of this period, namely Plato‘s era, and of 
course not the legislation of a modern Western state, this unequal treatment of slaves did not 
constitute an infringement of equality (ἰζνλνκία).  
Nevertheless, Plato‘s thought is far away from this way of thinking. In particular the four different 
categories of people in Magnesia, namely ―citizens‖ (πνιίηαη), resident aliens (μέλνη κέηνηθνη), 
temporary visitors (μέλνη ἐπηδεκνῦληεο) and slaves (δνῦινη) do have a different educational 
background, or more precisely a different level of παηδεία. According to the Athenian, it is less 
possible for educated citizens either to harm their city or other citizens than for the uneducated people. 
Therefore Plato‘s criterion of punishment in the Laws is the education (παηδεία) of the criminal. This 
distinction is more evident in the case of slaves as Saunders puts it ―The slave has had no education at 
all; he is no easy chattel, and he is not to be punished by judicial admonition, as one might punish a 
freeman, but by strict justice‖212. Besides, at the beginning of the twelfth book it is clarified that if a 
citizen who has been reared in the way he is to be reared in a city plunders his city then he should be 
punished more harshly than a slave
213
. To be more accurate, a nurtured citizen who harms his city is 
impossible to be cured, because despite the fact that he did receive education and nurture he wronged. 
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However, in Magnesia the barriers put between freeborn and slaves are very strict. A slave can never 
be equal to a freeborn
214
. Of course this distinction is in effect and in the case of education as only 
freemen will have access to education. The slaves will remain uneducated and by extension they will 
be punished differently. In other words this discrimination in favor of the freemen perpetuates the 
inequality among people‘s punishment in Magnesia.   
So which is the relationship of punishment and justice with democratic or undemocratic aspects? I 
propose that the reason according to which someone punishes does have relation with democratic or 
undemocratic aspects. In statu nascendi, when punishment is irrevocable, such as death penalty or 
exile without returning (αεἰθπγία), then it does have an absolutist, a totalitarian background.  The 
reason why I say this is that such a punishment does not leave room for second chance and 
rehabilitation of former offenders in Magnesia. In addition the Athenian‘s view about the existence of 
incurable diseases is also based in a totalitarian way of thinking. To put it differently it is very 
difficult to say with certainty that a disease is impossible to be cured. In the case of the Laws citizens 
who wrong voluntarily and are educated are supposed to be incurable. But why? Would the education 
of Magnesia be so perfect that when ―educated‖ citizens wrong would ipso facto considered as 
incurable? Ultimately, what is incurable? Is it something that science or education is not yet able to 
cure or something that it is impossible to be cured and will remain incurable ἐζαεί? I did not find an 
explicit answer to these questions in the Laws. 
                                                                        BOOK X 
2.10.  The condemnation of atheism 
The biggest part of the tenth book cannot be correlated with democratic or undemocratic aspects as 
the interlocutors are trying to prove three facts. First that ‗gods exist‘ (ζενὶ εηζί)215, secondly that they 
are‗careful‘ (ἐπηκειεῖο) and thirdly that ‗it is impossible for them to be seduced to transgress justice‘ 
(θαὶ παξὰ ηὸ δίθαηνλ ὡο παληάπαζηλ ὰπαξαίηεηνη)216. However, in the end of this book emerges again 
the issue of punishment; but this time the interlocutors exchange opinions about the punishment of 
those who are accused of impiety to gods (ἀζέβεηα)217. The most lenient punishment for such people 
will be the imprisonment. However, certain categories of impious people will be put to death. In 
particular, those who are considered as ‗taunting‘ (ὧλ ηὸ κὲλ εἰξσληθὸλ νὐρ ἑλὸο νὐδὲ δπνῖλ ἄμηα 
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ζαλάηνηλ ἁκάξηαλνλ)218 and those who believe that ‗gods are neglectful‘ (ηὸ ζενὺο λόκηδνλ ἀκειεῖλ) 
or that ‗they are open to bribes‘ (παξαηηεηνὶ εἰζί)219. It is needless to stress again the authoritarian 
aspect of capital punishment as I did it in the previous book. 
Nevertheless, I would like to share a thought that may seem puzzling. In 399 BC Socrates was put to 
death after having been charged with two indictments. The first accusation ascribed to him was that 
‗he corrupted the youth‘ (Σσθξάηε θεζὶλ ἀδηθεῖλ ηνύο ηε λένπο δηαθζείξνληα) and the second that ‗he 
did not believe in the gods of the city‘ (ζενὺο νὕο ἡ πόιηο λνκίδεη νὐ λνκίδνληα, ἕηεξα δὲ δαηκόληα 
θαηλά)220. The latter indictment, that of atheism (ἀζεΐα), could be associated with the accusation 
exposed in the Laws against people who deny the existence of gods. In the Laws such disbelievers 
could be executed. But can anyone imagine what would have happened if Socrates had lived in 
Magnesia of the Laws? Would he have been severely punished by Plato? Well, though this is too 
interesting a question but it is also too hypothetical and besides out of scope of this thesis. 
 
                                                                 BOOK XI 
2.11. Magnesia: Neither a rich nor a poor colony 
In this book it is explicitly stated that the citizens of Magnesia ‗will be provided with full satisfaction 
of their needs and with evenness in their properties‘ (π᾵ζηλ ἐπηθνπξίαλ ηαῖο ρξείαηο ἐμεππνξεῖλ θαὶ 
ὁκαιόηεηα ηαῖο νὐζίαηο)221.  This proposal expressed by the Athenian Stranger has a deep democratic 
background, as it aims at establishing well-being for all the people of their in speech colony. More 
specifically, it aims at distributing the goods throughout the community and of course it treats the 
citizens of Magnesia on equal terms. This is exactly the quintessence of democracy because it cares 
about the whole society without excluding people from it. Furthermore, the road to welfare should 
pass through the fight both against ‗poverty‘ and ‗plenty‘ (θαὶ δὴ θαὶ λῦλ ἡ ηνύησλ θαὶ πεξὶ ηαῦηά  
ἐζηη πξὸο δύν κάρε, πελίαλ θαὶ πινῦηνλ)222.  
Apart from this, the fact that this prosperity of citizens in Magnesia is deeply democratic and also 
very innovative for its era is also affirmed by another point. In particular, if someone looks into the 
distribution of wealth in democratic Athens they will find out that it was not equal
223
.  The existence 
of rich and poor people in Athens of fourth century B.C. could not be disputed. As a matter of fact the 
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citizens of Magnesia would be more self-sufficient and prosperous than the Athenians. However, in 
the Laws the highest priority of the interlocutors is the support of the state interest. Accurately, 
citizens should regard ‗property‘ (νὐζία) not exclusively as theirs, but as ‗a belonging of the whole 
state‘224. The Athenian declares this fact explicitly (θαὶ ἔηη κ᾵ιινλ η῅ο πόιεσο εἶλαη ηὴλ νὐζίαλ)225. 
As a matter of fact the Athenian shows great devotion to the interest of the state. But why does he do 
so? Because, according to him only if people of Magnesia look after the common interest of their state 
and not their personal benefit will they be able to coexist in peace (ὅ ηη δὲ ηῆ πόιεη ηε ἄξηζηνλ πάζῃ 
θαὶ γέλεη, πξὸο π᾵λ ηνῦην βιέπσλ λνκνζεηήζσ, ηὸ ἑλὸο ἑθάζηνπ θαηαηηζεὶο ἐλ κνίξαηο ἐιάηηνζη 
δηθαίσο. ὑκεῖο δὲ ἡκῖλ ἵιεώ ηε θαὶ εὐκελεῖο ὄληεο πνξεύνηζζε ᾗπεξ θαηὰ θύζηλ λῦλ πνξεύεζζε ηὴλ 
ἀλζξώπηλελ)226. Therefore the individual interest is inferior to the common interest. 
 
2.11.1 The priority to the male in the testamen  
What is very interesting in the Laws is the way that parents should bequeath their property to their 
children. Particularly, in most cases parents who write a ‗will‘ (δηαζήθε) should have as first option 
their sons. It is characteristic that even if a testator does not have sons but only daughters then he 
should select a citizen to marry his daughter
227. This citizen will be the ‗heir‘ (θιεξνλόκνο) of the 
property. In addition, if a man dies intestate and have only daughters then again daughters should not 
inherit the ‗lot‘ (θι῅ξνο). Instead of them, either the brother of the deceased man who is born from the 
same father (ηνῦ ἀπνζαλόληνο ἀδειθὸο ὁκνπάησξ) or the brother born from the same mother and 
without a lot (ἄθιεξνο ὁκνκήηξηνο) will receive the lot228. Therefore, there is no doubt that as far as 
inheritance is concerned women are not treated on equal terms with men. However, this unequal 
treatment of women does not entail that they are presented as lesser beings throughout the Laws. 
Could this discrimination against women be characterized as undemocratic?  It would not be useful to 
interpret this prejudice against women from what today is in effect. Undoubtedly, in the modern 
western states such an infringement of women‘s rights is impossible to imagine. However, if someone 
takes heed of what was in effect in ancient Greece then they will understand that women were not 
equally treated to men in the cases of will succession. To be more accurate, ‗No Greek state ever 
enfranchised women‘229. As far as Athens is concerned, women were not considered to be ‗politai‘ 
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(πνιίηαη), but ‗astai‘ (ἀζηαί), namely they were not able to vote in the public assemblies. Therefore, 
even in democratic Athens of the fourth century B.C. women were inferior to men. As a result taking 
despite the fact that Athens was considered to be the role model for democracy as far as women are 
concerned this prejudice could be characterized as undemocratic.  
Furthermore, as far as testaments are concerned, despite the fact that the law was different in 
particulars from city to city they also had a common structure. As David M. Schaps puts it 
―Inheritance rights were determined by family proximity, but a woman had no right of inheritance in 
the presence of an equally close male‖230. In addition, even in democratic Athens a woman who was 
‗epikleros‘ (ἐπίθιεξνο), that is to say when she was receiving the lot because were no sons to inherit it, 
then she should got married a man who would be the administrator of the inheritance
231
. Consequently, 
it is of paramount importance to point out that in this historical period women throughout Greece 
were not treated on equal terms with men.  
2.11.2. Censorship in comedy and exclusion of „τέχνη ῥητοπική‟ from Magnesia 
Another element related to the research question of this thesis is the proposal expressed by the 
Athenian Stranger for the censorship of comedians who aim at ridiculing citizens (ηὴλ η῵λ θσκῳδ῵λ 
πξνζπκίαλ ηνῦ γεινῖα εἰο ηνὺο ἀλζξώπνπο ιέγεηλ)232. Particularly, by using imperative mood the 
Athenian strictly forbids composers either of comedies or of iambic and lyric songs from mocking 
other citizens (πνηεηῆ δὴ θσκῳδίαο ἤ ηηλνο ἰάκβσλ ἤ Μνπζ῵λ κειῳδίαο κὴ ἐμέζησ κήηε ιόγῳ κήηε 
εἰθόλη, κήηε ζπκῶ κήηε ἄλεπ ζπκνῦ, κεδακ῵ο κεδέλα η῵λ πνιηη῵λ θσκῳδεῖλ)233. Nevertheless, it is 
very important to stress that this suppression of the comedian speech is not valid in all cases. To be 
more accurate the Athenian Stranger does not banish comedy per se. On the contrary, some 
comedians will be granted by permission to parody other citizens provided that they will act in jest 
(κεηὰ παηδη᾵ο) and that they will not be imbued with passion, with wrath (ἐλ ζπκῶ). Therefore, what 
he forbids is the intention to humiliate another citizen. But could this censorship be characterized as 
undemocratic? 
At this point emerges the perplexing issue of the freedom of speech. Particularly, which are the 
boundaries of freedom of speech? However, as far as this passage of the Laws is concerned, that the 
situation is not so puzzling. The fact that from the very beginning the Athenian aims at distinguishing 
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which comedies deserve permission and which not is opposed to democracy. In a way he muzzles 
many comedian works aborning, because they could potentially harm other people. On the contrary, 
in a democratic state, the ‗dēmos‘ (δ῅κνο), people are those who will applaud or disapprove a certain 
comedy. What is more the fact that the Athenian Stranger seems to be so severe to comedy is not an 
incident. Apparently, the cause of this restriction to this category of comedians already expressed is 
the influence that the famous comedy of Aristophanes ―Clouds‖ (Νεθέιαη) had in the prosecution of 
Socrates in 399 B.C. In the ―Apology of Socrates‖ there is an explicit reference to this comedy as 
Socrates claims that: (ὡο ἔζηη ηηο Σσθξάηεο ζνθὸο ἀλήξ, ηά ηε κεηέσξα θξνληηζηὴο θαὶ ηὰ ὑπὸ γ῅ο 
ἅπαληα ἀλεδεηεθὼο θαὶ ηὸλ ἥηησ ιόγνλ θξείηησ πνηεῖλ)234.It is evident that Plato does not envisage a 
colony in which comedians would be able to humble other people. Thus he aims at putting very 
severe barriers. Besides we should always bear in mind that in democratic Athens many people were 
censored for various reasons (e.g. Protagoras of Abdera, Aspasia the woman of Pericles, 
Anaxagoras)
235
.   
Another undemocratic element is the exclusion of‗téchnē rhētorikḗ‘ (ηέρλε ῥεηνξηθή) from Magnesia. 
Particularly the Athenian claims explicitly that it should be excluded from Magnesia either it is an art 
or not (ηαύηελ νὖλ ἐλ ηῆ παξ‘ ἡκῖλ πόιεη, εἴη᾽ νὖλ ηέρλε εἴηε ἄηερλόο ἐζηίλ ηηο ἐκπεηξία θαὶ ηξηβή, 
κάιηζηα κὲλ δὴ ρξεώλ ἐζηηλ κὴ θῦλαη)236.In this case the Athenian banishes rhetoric per se, whilst as 
far as comedy is concerned he did not act in the same way. According to him rhetoric has an erosive 
influence on people. With the use of a simile, the Athenian Stranger claims that in the same way as 
‗cankers‘ (θ῅ξεο) cling to the just things and ‗poison‘ (θαηακηαίλνπζη) them, so does rhetoric in the 
justice.Many orators distort the truth in order to win the victory in a court. Either the plea is just or not 
such orators misrepresent it in favor of their interest. As a result they harm justice. At this point again 
fits very well what Socrates told in his ―Apology‖, namely (θαὶ ηὸλ ἥηησ ιόγνλ θξείηησ πνηεῖλ) as 
already expressed. Such an ability had those orators, namely to make a weak plea strong and vice 
versa. 
                                                                     BOOK XII 
2.12. The nocturnal council 
At the beginning of the twelfth book, the Athenian Stranger proposes the enactment of laws 
concerning the duties of ambassadors and military organization. After finishing with that, the 
legislation of Magnesia is in a sense ‗complete‘ 237 .What remains in this new phase is the 
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establishment of a mechanism which will ensure ´the salvation of laws‘ (ηὴλ ζσηεξίαλ η῵λ λόκσλ)238. 
Such a mechanism is the nocturnal council (λπθηεξηλὸο ζύιινγνο)239 which aims at superintending the 
laws established in Magnesia (ηὸλ ζύιινγνλ ἴησ ηὸλ η῵λ πεξὶ λόκνπο ἐπνπηεπόλησλ)240 and being the 
safeguard (θπιαθηήξηνλ)241  of this colony, as it would be ‗a means of salvation of polity and its laws‘ 
242
. This synod (ζύιινγνο) will be comprised by the elite of Magnesia, namely by distinguished 
citizens in certain domains
243
 instilled with every virtue (π᾵ζαλ ἀξεηὴλ ἔρεηλ)244. Occasione data the 
achievement of π᾵ζα ἀξεηή was one of the fundamental aims of the Athenian in the first book of the 
Laws
245
 . At this point in twelth book an aristocratic element emerges. Specifically, the fact that the 
participation in the nocturnal council is feasible only for citizens with exceptional skills and 
experience, for instance the ten πξεζβύηαηνη λνκνθύιαθεο246 in cooperation with citizens who have 
won ἀξηζηεῖα247 , constitutes an aristocratic element. 
Apart from this, in the end of this book lies an authoritarian element. In particular, if the nocturnal 
council comes into existence then Magnesia should be subjected to it (παξαδνηένλ ηνύηῳ ηὴλ πόιηλ) 
and the lawgivers will not be entitled to dispute this fact (ἀκθηζβήηεζίο η‘νὐθ ἔζη‘ νὐδεκία νὐδελὶ 
η῵λ λῦλ παξὰ ηαῦζ‘ ὡο ἔπνο εἰπεῖλ λνκνζεη῵λ)248. This indisputable sovereignty of the nocturnal 
council could be part only of an authoritarian regime. It is worthy of note that the words used by the 
Athenian Stranger, namely ‗no dispute‘ (νὐδεκία ἀκθηζβήηεζηο) by ‗noone lawgiver‘ (νὐδελὶ η῵λ 
λνκνζεη῵λ) elucidate the unquestionable dominance of the nocturnal council in Magnesia. On the 
contrarysuch a mastery could hardly existin a democratic state, as the citizens would be able to 
discuss and question the proposals of the nocturnal council.    
Nevertheless, apart from those elements the nocturnal council has also a democratic orientation. 
Firstly this synod will not aim at fulfilling their vested interest but it will give prominence to the 
salvation of the state. Of course citizens are an integral part of the state and their well-being and 
salvation depends to a great extent on the prosperity of the state. This intention is elucidated by the 
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metaphor that the Athenian Stranger uses
249
. Accurately, the nocturnal council will act in the same 
way as a captain of a ship (θπβεξλήηεο ἐλ λεΐ)250 , who cooperates with the sailors in order to secure 
the salvation both of the shipboard and the sailors. The captain uses his reason (ηῶ θπβεξλεηηθῶ λῶ) 
and the sailors their senses (αἰζζήζεηο) which are bridled by the reason of the pilot so as to save the 
ship. Each category of people in the ship has a specific role and contributes to the common interest 
which is the salvation of the ship and of course of the people who are in it. Therefore, I maintain that 
this intention of the nocturnal council to serve the interest of the state and not the interest of a certain 
ruling class is democratic, as democracy also aims at the fulfillment of common interest. 
Consequently, I suggest that the nocturnal council combines both democratic and undemocratic 
elements. This combination may be in line with the fact that the Laws themselves are inculcated with 
these contrasting features. Besides, it is remarkable that none of the Greek States had such a nocturnal 
council can be found in the way that his Academy used to function
251
.  
2.12.1. The metaphor of the ship in the Republic and the Laws 
In the sixth book of the Republic Plato likens the governance of a city to the control of a ship. This 
metaphor does also exist in the twelfth book of the Laws
252
. However, what is new in the Laws is that 
there is a difference between them that is strictly related with the topic of this thesis. To be more 
precise, as far as the Republic is concerned the philosopher king who will command the ship will have 
to face the scorn of the sailors and their ardent desire to possess the helm of the ship
253
. Nevertheless, 
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in the Laws this is not the case. In a way the captain of the ship will cooperate with the sailors as both 
of them will marshal their skills for the secure of the ship. The commander will use his ‗pilot mind‘ 
(θπβεξλεηηθόο λνῦο) and the sailors their ‗senses‘ (αἰζζήζεηο). 
I perceive this cooperation as a gentle curve from the aristocratic and elitist institution of the 
philosopher kings to a profoundly less authoritarian regime. In other words, according to the metaphor 
of the Laws there is no hint that there will be serious conflicts among the captain of the ship and the 
sailors. On the contrary both of them will contribute to the salvation of the ship after ‗having 
combined‘ (ζπγθεξαζκάκελνη) their skills. If we interpret this metaphor in the context of Magnesia 
we will see that the ruling class-captain- will not try to harshly subdue the citizens-sailors- of 
Magnesia. There is no need for such a repression as not only the group in power but also the people 
are eager to contribute to the salvation of the ship which symbolically is the ἐλ ιόγῳ city. 
Nevertheless the basic core of hierarchy remains stagnant as in both Callipolis and Magnesia the 
dividing line between ruled and ruled will not be ruptured.  
2.12.2. Nocturnal council and philosopher king: divergence or convergence? 
Many scholars compare and contrast the nocturnal council (λπθηεξηλόο ζύιινγνο) of the Laws with 
the philosopher king in the Republic of Plato. Most of them argue that the nocturnal council in the 
Laws replaced the function of the philosopher king as established in the Republic. But let us approach 
this comparison without taking for granted what each distinguished scholar proposes. Firstly, indeed 
both the synod and the philosopher king do possess a strong educational background and a status quo 
in the society either it is Callipolis or Magnesia. This fact can hardly be denied. 
Nevertheless, it would be very interesting to examine if they have differences. At first the noun 
ζύιινγνο, which means the assembly254, entails that the participants in it discuss the topics mooted, in 
opposition to the philosopher king (βαζηιεύο), who is the only one that takes decisions. However, the 
semantic field of the word ζύιινγνο includes the meaning of the presence of mind255. To be more 
precise that the most intelligent, mindful people are part of this assembly. In any case, I suggest that 
the difference lies in the fact that the nocturnal council is a more open institution than the proposal for 
the sovereignty of philosopher kings which would be a very close group. In addition the synod is an 
assembly so participants, even if they are an elite, they do exchange opinions whist the philosopher 
kings possess the highest truth so there is no room for discussion, but only for action. 
In addition to this, the nocturnal council is willing, under certain circumstances, to learn what is in 
effect in other citiesabout certain domains such as this of legislation, education and nurture. People 
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who have travelled abroad
256
will give this information to the members of the nocturnal council. This 
fact may imply that the synod is open to admit new proposals about these domains. If this is true, then 
it constitutes another difference with the way that the philosopher kings in the Republic act. To be 
more precise, in opposition to the philosopher kingswho are not eager to accept anything but the Ideas, 
the synod may espouse some aspects that have already been applied in other cities. Another 
significant difference proposed by Bartels  
257
 is that in the Laws there is no hint that the members of 
the synod will possess ‗transcendent‘ or ‗metaphysical‘ knowledge. On the contrary, their knowledge 
is based on their experiences and of course on their intellectual skills. In addition to this, throughout 
the twelfth book there is no reference to the theory of Forms that is the quintessence of the Republic. 
However, except for the discrepancies there are also profound similarities between the council and the 
philosopher kings. Apart from the common high intellectual background that has already been 
analyzed, the sovereignty of both of them in their cities cannot be put into question. As far as the 
council is concerned, the Athenian states that the city should be subject to it and the lawgivers should 
not raise objections
258
. So even if they receive reports from the ‗observers‘ (ζεσξνύο)259, this fact does 
not mean that the synod has lost its dominance. What is more, both of them do have a common aim, 
which is not other than the support of the state‘s interest and stability. Therefore the elitism and the 
sovereignty of the synod and the philosopher kings are more fact than fiction. 
Consequently, there is indisputably a common ground between the synod and the philosophers, 
videlicet the high mentality, but in any case they cannot be identified. The reason why they cannot be 
considered as exactly the same is that their structure and way of function are different. But which 
could be the relation of this comparison with democratic and undemocratic aspects in the Laws, the 
topic of this thesis? Well I suggest that this comparison shows the slight of Plato‘s political thought 
from the Republic to the Laws. In other words, the predominance of the philosopher kings which is 
inculcated with a deep elitist and totalitarian background, is converted into a ζύιινγνο that does have 
a democratic tincture despite its high requirements in order to become a member of it.  
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After having detected and explained the background of all these democratic and undemocratic 
features in the Laws it is time for conclusion.It will follow an attempt to approach as much as possible 
the political color of Magnesia.  The steps that will be followed are firstly a comparison of Magnesia 
with democratic Athens, secondly a comparison with Callipolis of Plato‘s Republic and thirdly a 
reference to Popper‘s approach to the Laws.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
3.1.   Comparison of Magnesia with democratic Athens 
If the conclusion of this thesis would be just that Magnesia will be comprised of both democratic and 
undemocratic aspects it would be like bringing owls to Athens
260
. Aristotle in his work Politics 
stressed that Magnesia would consist of both democratic and oligarchic characteristics
261
. However, 
after analyzing the background of these elements, it would be fruitful to illustrate the political color of 
Magnesia, as much as it is possible. A comparison of Magnesia‘s way of functioning, as concisely 
exposed in the introduction of this thesis, with that of democratic Athens would help to approach this 
goal; such a tangible comparison with historic constitutions of this era could make Magnesia‘s 
constitution more suitable to understand. As Gottesman stresses, ―the Laws demands to be read cross-
eyed, as it were, with one eye on Platonic philosophy and with the other on Athenian institutions and 
practices
262‖. After that it would be also helpful to make a concise comparison with Callipolis, the 
ideal city of Plato‘s Republic in order to have a more thorough image about Plato‘s politics. 
As far as the relation of Magnesia with democratic Athens is concerned there are mainly significant 
discrepancies and certain similarities. At first, in opposition to Athens
263
, Magnesia would not be a 
place accessible to everyone. As it has already been explained certain categories of people, tragic 
poets for instance, would not be allowed to enter the Magnesia and besides people would undergo a 
purge
264
. Secondly, in Magnesia the practice of lot, that was common in the possession of authorities 
in Athens, would not be the case.  Its citizens could get an office, for instance to become guardians of 
the laws, through elections
265
; this fact may imply that people who voted for them regarded them as 
skilfull in this domain. In opposition to this, Athenians‘ viewpoint was that elections were an 
oligarchic procedure as the act of choosing for a task a certain man instead of another did violate 
equality. The background of their belief was that if all men are regarded as equal, then they do equally 
deserve to possess anoffice. Therefore, in Magnesia the criteria according to which citizens could 
possess authority was not the chance of the lot, as in democratic Athens, but their background, their 
skills and experience in certain domains. 
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 It is a famous proverb ―θνκίδσ γιαῦθα ἐο Ἀζήλαο‖ used for people who boast of saying something 
innovative, but in fact they do not. For further details see <http://glauxnest.blogspot.nl/2010/11/bringing-owls-
to-athens.html> 
261
 Aristotle Politics 1266a-b 
262
 Gottesman (2014) 180-181 
263
 It is characteristic the famous passage from Thucydides according to which the Athenians used to welcome 
host strangers. Thucydides 2.39.1: ηήλ ηε γὰξ πόιηλ θνηλὴλ παξέρνκελ, θαὶ νὐθ ἔζηηλ ὅηε μελειαζίαηο 
ἀπείξγνκέλ ηηλα ἢ καζήκαηνο ἢ ζεάκαηνοὃ κὴ θξπθζὲλ ἄλ ηηο η῵λ πνιεκίσλ ἰδὼλ ὠθειεζείε, πηζηεύνληεο νὐ 
ηαῖο παξαζθεπαῖο ηὸ πιένλ θαὶ ἀπάηαηο ἢ ηῶ ἀθ᾽ ἡκ῵λ αὐη῵λ ἐο ηὰ ἔξγα εὐςύρῳ˙  (We leave our city open to 
all men; nor was it ever seen that by banishing of strangers we denied them the learning or sight of any of those 
things which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by, not relying on secret preparation and deceit but 
upon our own courage in the action). Transl. Hobbes (1989) 
264
  See chapter 2.5. of the thesis. 
265
  Plato  Laws 753c-d 
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Except for this, women in Magnesia would not be treated in the same way as Athens. As it has already 
been explained
266
 the basic tasks of women in ancient Athens were mainly to care for their husbands 
and the nurture of their children. In additionthey did not participate in the public assembly of Athens. 
As O‘Neal stresses the role model for women in ancient Athens was this of Penelope as depicted in 
Odyssey
267
. In opposition to this, in Magnesia women would receive the same education as men
268
 and 
would have a voice in the political proceedings
269
. As a result, in this case Magnesia would not 
exclude women from the political eventsand by extension this element could be characterized as 
democratic. 
Nevertheless, Magnesia and Athens do also have certain similarities. Firstly in both of these states the 
existence of slaves lacking in political rights was a fact. In Magnesia the dividing line between slaves 
and master is explicitly stated by the Athenian
270
.  Secondly, capital punishment was also in effect in 
classical Athens
271
. Apart from these similarities which can be characterized as undemocratic, we 
should also take into account that both the Magnesia and Athens did have an assembly and a council. 
However their function was different and the way of election in Magnesia was not made by lot. This 
practice has a common ground with democratic elitism which means that the citizens of Magnesia 
would decide who the best for the possession of authorities were. As Stalley puts it ―He sees elections 
as a means of ensuring that political offices are held by properly qualifies candidates whose character 
and education enable them to do what is right‖272. 
3.2. Concise comparison of Magnesia with Callipolis 
A detailed comparison of Magnesia with Callipolis could be a thesis itself. However, at this point it 
would be proper to briefly illustrate the gentle curve of Plato‘s politics as it has already been 
described in 2.12.1 and 2.12.2 of this thesis. Firstly, the fundamental principle between these two 
works is that whilst the city of the Republic, Callipolis, is a theoretical model
273
 not meant to be 
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  See in this thesis 2.7.1: Women and men: equal beings  
267
  O'Neal, William (1993) 115: ―The heroic order depicted Penelope as the absolute role model for Greek 
Athenian women.‖ 
268
  Plato  Lawς 805c8-d 
269
  Plato  Laws  805c7-d 
270
  Plato  Laws 757a3-5:  Ἀζελαῖνο:δνῦινη γὰξ ἂλ θαὶ δεζπόηαη νὐθ ἄλ πνηε γέλνηλην θίινη, νὐδὲ ἐλ ἴζαηο 
ηηκαῖο δηαγνξεπόκελνη θαῦινη θαὶ ζπνπδαῖνη (For slaves will neverbe friends with masters, nor bad men with 
good, even when they occupy equal positions). Transl.  Bury (1926) 
271
  Allen (2003) 16-17: ―In fact,the  standard  means  of  execution was not poison but a form of bloodless 
crucifixion in which the convict was (probably) fastened to a board with iron collars around wrists, ankles, and 
neck, and the collar around the neck was tightened to strangle the wrongdoer.‖ 
272
  Stalley (1983)  122 
273
  Plato Republic 592b2-5: Σσθξάηεο: ἀιι᾽, ἦλ δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐλ νὐξαλῶ ἴζσο παξάδεηγκα ἀλάθεηηαη ηῶ βνπινκέλῳ 
ὁξ᾵λ θαὶ ὁξ῵ληη ἑαπηὸλ θαηνηθίδεηλ. δηαθέξεη δὲ νὐδὲλ εἴηε πνπ ἔζηηλ εἴηε ἔζηαη: ηὰ γὰξ ηαύηεο κόλεο ἂλ 
πξάμεηελ, ἄιιεο δὲ νὐδεκη᾵ο (―Well,‖ said I, ―perhaps there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who 
wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. But it makes no difference whether it 
exists now or ever will come into being. The politics of this city only will be his and of  none other). Transl. 
Shorey ( 1935) 
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practically applied, Magnesia has a more pragmatic and practical orientation. Magnesia ―is within the 
horizons of possibility‖274.  Whilst in the Republic there is the sovereignty of the philosopher king 
who is truly virtuous because only he has a thorough command of the Form of good, in Magnesia this 
is not the case. There are significant differences between these two works of Plato. The first one is 
that in Magnesia there are more people who participate in the political proceedings than in the 
Republic. A telling example is this of the law- guardians that can come from all the classes
275
. In 
Magnesia there are also many institutions that have to do with the ruling of the colony such as the the 
assembly, the council, the guardians of the laws, the country wardens. All these institutions would not 
be under the predominance of a philosopher king. In addition many times these institutions would be 
able to check other institutions
276
.  
 The second difference is that in Magnesia people are not excluded from approaching ἀξεηή from the 
outset
277
. When the Athenian describes the road that people should follow to achieve π᾵ζαλ ἀξεηήλ 
through education there is no hint that there are people who cannot reach this goal
278
. In addition the 
Athenian refers to all the people who would reside in Magnesia
279
. On the other hand, in the Republic 
there is a detailed analysis of the education which guardians would undergo. As Aristotle stresses
280
, 
in the Republic Socrates does not refer to the education that the majority of people would receive but 
he analyzes only that of guardians. Therefore in the Laws there is an attempt to impart ἀξεηή to all the 
citizens of Magnesia, whilst in Callipolis there is no clue about such an intention. Consequently the 
upshot of this comparison is that Plato did a curve from the quintessence elitism embodied in the 
philosopher king to a less elitist proposal as expressed in the institutions of the Laws, for instance the 
nocturnal council 
                                                          
274
  Gottesman (2014) 181, 184: ― Magnesia is presented as one that is within the horizons of possibility…. 
Republic, in comparison with the Laws, is much less a blueprint for an ideal society than a sketch of one in the 
service of other ends‖.   
275
  Gottesman (2014) 188: ― Law- guardians are among the most important officials in Magnesia. They have 
broad responsibilities and powers and serve until age seventy. Law- guardians can come from any property‖.  
For more information see Morrow (1960) 195-215. 
276
 For instance the scrutineers (Plato ,Laws, 945b-948b) will be able to check the conduct in office of all 
officials and to impose penalties when appropriate. 
277
   See 2.1.3. of this thesis.  
278
   Plato Laws 644d-645c 
279
  The fact that later in the dialogue there are some people supposed to be unteachable could not be a 
counterargument, as the Athenian in principle gives a chance to all the people to receive education. He does not 
exclude people from the beginning.  
280
   Aristotle Politics 1264a11-15 : νὐ κὴλ ἀιι᾽ νὐδὲ ὁ ηξόπνο η῅ο ὅιεο πνιηηείαο ηίο ἔζηαη ηνῖο θνηλσλνῦζηλ, 
νὔη᾽ εἴξεθελ ὁ Σσθξάηεο νὔηε ῥᾴδηνλ εἰπεῖλ. θαίηνη ζρεδὸλ ηό γε πι῅ζνο η῅ο πόιεσο ηὸ η῵λ ἄιισλ πνιηη῵λ 
γίλεηαη πι῅ζνο, πεξὶ ὧλ νὐδὲλ δηώξηζηαη, πόηεξνλ θαὶ ηνῖο γεσξγνῖο θνηλὰο εἶλαη δεῖ ηὰο θηήζεηο ἢ θαὶ θαζ᾽ 
ἕθαζηνλ ἰδίαο, ἔηη δὲ θαὶ γπλαῖθαο θαὶ παῖδαο ἰδίνπο ἢ θνηλνύο. (Moreover, the working of the constitution as a 
whole in regard to the members of the state has also not been described by Socrates, nor is it easy to say what it 
will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens of the other classes make almost the bulk of the state, and about 
these no definite regulations are laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to have their property in common 
or to hold it in private ownership, and also whether community of wives and children is to apply to them or not). 
Transl. Rackham (1932) 
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3.3 Popper‟s approach to the Laws 
At this point it would be helpful for a fruitful analysis of the Laws to adduce the opinion of Popper. 
Popper claims that Plato is an ardent enemy of individualism
281
. As far as his approach to the Laws is 
concerned he maintains that people in Magnesia are treated not as individual beings but as a totality, 
as a collective group. To prove his point, Popper refers to two passages from the Laws. The first 
passage is taken from the fifth book of the Laws. In this the Athenian Stranger claims that the best 
city is this that (739b8-e3):          
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   Popper (1945) 102: ―an astonishing hostility towards the individuals‖ 
πξώηε κὲλ ηνίλπλ πόιηο ηέ ἐζηηλ θαὶ πνιηηεία θαὶ 
λόκνη ἄξηζηνη, ὅπνπ ηὸ πάιαη ιεγόκελνλ ἂλ γίγλεηαη 
θαηὰ π᾵ζαλ ηὴλ πόιηλ ὅηη κάιηζηα· ιέγεηαη δὲ ὡο 
ὄλησο ἐζηὶ θνηλὰ ηὰ θίισλ. ηνῦη᾽ νὖλ εἴηε πνπ λῦλ 
ἔζηηλ εἴη᾽ ἔζηαη πνηέ— θνηλὰο κὲλ γπλαῖθαο, θνηλνὺο 
δὲ εἶλαη παῖδαο, θνηλὰ δὲ ρξήκαηα ζύκπαληα—θαὶ 
πάζῃ κεραλῆ ηὸ ιεγόκελνλ ἴδηνλ παληαρόζελ ἐθ ηνῦ 
βίνπ ἅπαλ ἐμῄξεηαη, κεκεράλεηαη δ᾽ εἰο ηὸ δπλαηὸλ 
θαὶ ηὰ θύζεη ἴδηα θνηλὰ ἁκῆ γέ πῃ γεγνλέλαη, νἷνλ 
ὄκκαηα θαὶ ὦηα θαὶ ρεῖξαο θνηλὰ κὲλ ὁξ᾵λ δνθεῖλ 
θαὶ ἀθνύεηλ θαὶ πξάηηεηλ, ἐπαηλεῖλ η᾽ αὖ θαὶ ςέγεηλ 
θαζ᾽ ἓλ ὅηη κάιηζηα ζύκπαληαο ἐπὶ ηνῖο αὐηνῖο 
ραίξνληαο θαὶ ιππνπκέλνπο, θαὶ θαηὰ δύλακηλ νἵηηλεο 
λόκνη κίαλ ὅηη κάιηζηα πόιηλ ἀπεξγάδνληαη, ηνύησλ 
ὑπεξβνιῆ πξὸο ἀξεηὴλ νὐδείο πνηε ὅξνλ ἄιινλ 
ζέκελνο ὀξζόηεξνλ νὐδὲ βειηίσ ζήζεηαη. ἡ κὲλ δὴ 
ηνηαύηε πόιηο, εἴηε πνπ ζενὶ ἢ παῖδεο ζε῵λ αὐηὴλ 
νἰθνῦζη πιείνπο ἑλόο, νὕησ δηαδ῵ληεο εὐθξαηλόκελνη 
θαηνηθνῦζη· δηὸ δὴ παξάδεηγκά γε πνιηηείαο νὐθ 
ἄιιῃ ρξὴ ζθνπεῖλ, ἀιι᾽ ἐρνκέλνπο ηαύηεο ηὴλ ὅηη 
κάιηζηα ηνηαύηελ δεηεῖλ θαηὰ δύλακηλ. 
( That State and polity come first, and those laws are 
best, where there is observed as carefully as possible 
throughout the whole State the old saying that 
―friends have all things really in common.‖ As to this 
condition,—whether it anywhere exists now, or ever 
will exist,—in which there is community of wives, 
children, and all chattels, and all that is called 
―private‖ is everywhere and by every means rooted 
out of our life, and so far as possible it is contrived 
that even things naturally ―private‖ have become in a 
way ―communized,‖ —eyes, for instance, and ears 
and hands seem to see, hear, and act in common,— 
and that all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in 
the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and 
grieving at the same things, and that they honor with 
all their heart those laws which render the State as 
unified as possible,—no one will ever lay down 
another definition that is truer or better than these 
conditions in point of super-excellence. In such a 
State,—be it gods or sons of gods that dwell in it,— 
they dwell pleasantly, living such a life as this. 
Wherefore one should not look elsewhere for a 
model constitution, but hold fast to this one, and with 
all one's power seek the constitution that is as like to 
it as possible) . 
Transl.  Bury (1926) 
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Prima facie, the point of Popper seems to be true, as he is right when he claims that citizens in the 
Laws are not treated as individual beings
282. The fact that the Athenian suggests that the ‗model 
constitution‘ (παξάδεηγκα) for a city is this that its citizens see, hear and act in common and that there 
should be no room for private in people‘s life (θαὶ πάζῃ κεραλῆ ηὸ ιεγόκελνλ ἴδηνλ παληαρόζελ ἐθ 
ηνῦ βίνπ ἅπαλ ἐμῄξεηαη) amounts to an attack to individualism. However, it would be also useful for a 
critical viewpoint to this passage to take into account that in this case the Athenian talks about the 
‗best polity‘ (ἀξίζηε πνιηηεία), that as he himself says, it can only be applied ‗among gods or children 
of gods‘. On the contrary, what the Athenian proposes for Magnesia is the establishment of the second 
best state (δεπηέξα ἀξίζηε πνιηηεία). In addition, the Athenian underscores that had they themselves 
tried to approach this best state they would have not achieved this goal, but something very close to it 
and ‗second in point of merit‘ (ηηκία δεπηέξσο)283. Therefore, despite the fact that Popper‘s argument 
is cogent, it would be also useful to have in mind that the Athenian himself admitts that his ‗model 
constitution‘ could hardly be applied in Magnesia, as it cannot be a perfect embodiment of this best 
state
284
. 
The second passage that Popper uses in his argumentation is taken from the twelfth book of the Laws 
in which the military organization of the in speech colony is analyzed. Popper accuses Plato of being 
―a totalitarian militarist and admirer of Sparta‖. Despite the fact that it has already been argued285 that 
Magnesia cannot be seen as a commendation on Sparta it is useful to examine the context of this 
passage. Let us first adduce the original passage in question from the Laws (942a7-c4).     
κέγηζηνλ δὲ ηὸ κεδέπνηε ἄλαξρνλ κεδέλα εἶλαη, κήη᾽ 
ἄξξελα κήηε ζήιεηαλ, κεδέ ηηλνο ἔζεη ςπρὴλ εἰζίζζαη 
κήηε ζπνπδάδνληνο κήη᾽ ἐλ παηδηαῖο αὐηὸλ ἐθ᾽ αὑηνῦ 
ηη θαηὰ κόλαο δξ᾵λ, ἀιι᾽ ἔλ ηε πνιέκῳ παληὶ θαὶ ἐλ 
εἰξήλῃ πάζῃ πξὸο ηὸλ ἄξρνληα ἀεὶ βιέπνληα θαὶ 
ζπλεπόκελνλ δ῅λ, θαὶ ηὰ βξαρύηαζ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐθείλνπ 
θπβεξλώκελνλ, νἷνλ ἑζηάλαη ζ᾽ ὅηαλ ἐπηηάηηῃ ηηο θαὶ 
πνξεύεζζαη θαὶ γπκλάδεζζαη θαὶ ινῦζζαη θαὶ 
ζηηεῖζζαη θαὶ ἐγείξεζζαη λύθησξ εἴο ηε θπιαθὰο θαὶ 
(The main principle is this—that nobody, male or 
female, should ever be left without control, nor should 
anyone, whether at work or in play, grow habituated in 
mind to acting alone and on his own initiative, but he 
should live always, both in war and peace, with his 
eyes fixed constantly on his commander and following 
his lead; and he should be guided by him even in the 
smallest detail of his actions—for example, to stand at 
the word of command, and to march, and to exercise, 
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 Popper (1945) 100: ―The term ‗individualism‘ can be used (according to the Oxford Dictionary) in two 
different ways: (a) in opposition to collectivism, and (b) in opposition to altruism. There is no other word to 
express the former meaning, but several synonyms for the latter, for example ‗egoism‘ or ‗selfishness‘. This is 
why in what follows I shall use the term ‗individualism‘ exclusively in sense (a), using terms like ‗egoism‘ or 
‗selfishness‘ if sense (b) is intended. A little table may be useful : (a) Individualism is opposed to (a‘) 
Collectivism 
(b) Egoism is opposed to (b‘) Altruism‖ 
283
 Plato Laws 739e4-5 Ἀζελαῖνο :εἴε ηε ἂλ γελνκέλε πσο ἀζαλαζίαο ἐγγύηαηα θαὶ ἡ κία δεπηέξσο- if it came 
into being, would be very near to immortality, and would come second in point of merit. (Bury proposes ηηκία 
δεπηέξσο whilst John Burnet proposes ἡ κία, England also proposes ἡ κία; on this see England (1921) 516) 
284
 For a detailed analysis of Popper arguments see Levinson R.B., 1953, 499-573 
285
 See  2.3.1.The constitution of Sparta: Ideal description? 
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παξαγγέιζεηο, θαὶ ἐλ αὐηνῖο ηνῖο θηλδύλνηο κήηε ηηλὰ 
δηώθεηλ κήζ᾽ ὑπνρσξεῖλ ἄιιῳ ἄλεπ η῅ο η῵λ ἀξρόλησλ 
δειώζεσο, ἑλί ηε ιόγῳ ηὸ ρσξίο ηη η῵λ ἄιισλ 
πξάηηεηλ δηδάμαη ηὴλ ςπρὴλ ἔζεζη κήηε γηγλώζθεηλ 
κήη᾽ ἐπίζηαζζαη ηὸ παξάπαλ, ἀιι᾽ ἁζξόνλ ἀεὶ θαὶ ἅκα 
θαὶ θνηλὸλ ηὸλ βίνλ ὅηη κάιηζηα π᾵ζη πάλησλ 
γίγλεζζαη. 
to wash and eat, to wake up at night for sentry-duty 
and despatch-carrying, and in moments of danger to 
wait for the commander's signal before either pursuing 
or retreating before an enemy; and, in a word, he must 
instruct his soul by habituation to avoid all thought or 
idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his 
company, so that the life of all shall be lived en masse 
and in common).  
Transl. Bury (1926) 
 
The military organization that is proposed is very fierce and it restricts the daily life of citizens in 
Magnesia as both in periods of war and peace they will lead the same frantic and demanding way of 
life. Magnesians will be deprived of the right personal freedom as it was in effect in democratic 
Athens
286
. However, as Stalley stresses, we should not abolish the fact that in the first book of the 
Laws there is an explicit opposition of the Athenian Stranger both to the strict militaristic systems of 
Sparta and Crete
287
. How could Plato reproach Sparta in the third book of the Laws, and in the twelfth 
to be an ―admirer of Sparta‖, as Popper claims? In addition to this, Morrow claims neither the 
Republic nor the Laws of Plato can be seen as an idealization of Sparta, as Plato did also criticize 
Sparta
288
.What I would also like to add is that the option of Popper to focus on this passage is not 
coincidental. In other words, a description of a military organization cannot have a democratic 
connotation as an inherent characteristic of army is the fierce hierarchy and obedience to the 
commander. Therefore, I submit that is in a way convenient for Popper to adduce such a passage in 
order to show Plato‘s opposition to individualism. 
 
3.4. Political color of Magnesia 
After all, what would be the political color of Magnesia? Despite the fact that a sure and unclouded 
answer is very difficult to be given I propose that two facts could hardly be disputed. In this way we 
can approach the political background of Magnesia by making a reduction ad absurdum. Firstly 
Magnesia would not be a democratic society in comparison with democratic Athens as the elitistic 
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  See page 7 of the thesis where I analyze the right of personal freedom in democratic Athens. 
287
  Stalley (1983) 182: ―Anyone who thinks the passage is evidence of militarism should remember that the 
dialogue began with an attack on the militaristic systems of Crete and Sparta)‖ see also an interesting 
explanation about Popper‘s critique to Plato  p. 185 ― It is perhaps understandable that Popper, living under the 
shadow of Hitler, should have been obsessed by the threat of dictatorship and should have interpreted Plato 
accordingly‖. 
288
 Morrow (1960) 45-47: ―Plato‘s attitude was equally a mixture of admiration and criticism…But its citizens 
distrust intelligence and are inclined to war rather than peace (547de). They (Spartans) are covetous of money, 
and since they cannot indulge their desire openly, they acquire their treasures secretly and hide them away from 
the law, as children evade their fathers (548ab). Even if Plato had not explicitly mentioned Sparta, it would be 
clear enough what state he had in mind; the avarice of the Spartans and the great wealth of gold and silver 
accumulated by some of them, in spite of the prohibition in the law, made one of the juiciest of Plato‘s time‖.   
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background of Magnesia already analyzed is incompatible with classical Athens. This fact cannot be 
questioned. However Magnesia would be more democratic than the Callipolis of the Republic as more 
people will be able to actively participate in instutions and take decisions on political matters. In 
addition the fact that people from Magnesia would be sent abroad to see what was in effect in other 
societies may imply that Magnesia would not be a totally closed society, but open to new proposals 
which have already been applied in other cities. Therefore even if it sounds simple and not 
oversimplified, Magnesia in a way would be less democratic than classical democratic Athens and 
more democratic than Callipolis.  
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